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CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP
AND
THE CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRACY

by

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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRACY submitted by Wallace Blair Williams, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

PREFACE

In the preparation of this thesis I have made an effort to write in layman's terms. This endeavor was simplified by a general dearth in literature dealing specifically with charismatic leadership -- although it should be said that there is an ever-increasing number of highly technical investigations which are relevant to democratic leadership. It is my conviction that a primary criterion for the usefulness of political theory is to be found in the extent to which it says something for laymen. The "rigorous" "compartmentalized" approach which seems to be increasingly the vogue in modern political analysis may be one result of the Political Scientist's gaze being fixed too much in the direction of the physical sciences -- toward a goal which may be neither attainable, nor wholly desirable. In my view, the trend toward specialization may have detrimental effects, not the least of which is its proclivity to achieve a level of expression which is incomprehensible for the "common man."

Theory which cannot be understood by laymen does a very limited amount of good. The essential purpose of theory must be to change, to implement, to strengthen, to justify, or to explain particular conditions under which men exist in a society. That which is desirable, once attained, can only endure when it is accompanied by understanding and the appropriate beliefs among the prevailing mass of the people. This is a notion which recurs in the third chapter: that is, that there is a danger when there is

too much of a gap between theory and practice; that there is a danger when people are unable to understand and therefore lag far behind the political philosophers of the day.

Within the past year I have been impressed with the fact that there appears to be at least two major openings which need to be filled in Political Science. Both are in the theoretical or conceptual realm. First, there seems to be a need for some sort of intermediate work between small group research and the study of politics in general. That is, there appears to be a shortage of personnel who are primarily concerned with providing the connecting links between the small experimental studies of the social psychologists and the study of mass phenomena at the level of national societies.

Secondly, there seems to be too few who are theorizing for the sake of science -- "behavioral conceptualizers." I believe that between the philosophy of politics and the sociology of politics there is a middle range which more people ought to occupy. Of course, this area includes elements of both theory and science. The primary function of this sort of approach is to conceptualize; to philosophize on the behavioral level; to tell the behaviorists what ought to be measured. This need is not unlike the first, mentioned above. It is not inconceivable that one person could fulfill both of these needs.

The philosopher cannot always describe reality accurately; not can the behaviorist always be convincing about what ought to be, or, for that matter, how his research relates to politics as a whole. What we may need, therefore, are theory oriented scientists

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W. Blair Williams

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Not toward the impossibility, 'self-government' of a multitude by a multitude; but toward some possibility, government by the wisest, does bewildered Europe struggle. The blesseddest possibility: not misgovernment, but Laissez-faire, but veritable government! Cannot one discern too, across all democratic turbulence, clattering of ballot boxes and infinite sorrowful jangle, needful or not, that this at bottom is the wish and prayer of all human hearts, everywhere and at all times: 'Give me a leader; a true leader, not a false sham-leader, that he may guide me on the true way, that I may be loyal to him and follow him, and feel that it is well with me!' The revelation of the taught to their teacher, of the loyal subject to his guiding king, is, under one shape or another, the vital element of human Society; indispensable to it, perennial in it; without which, as a body left of its soul, it falls down into death, and with horrid noisome dissolution passes away and disappears.

From Thomas Carlyle,
Chartism (1840).

INTRODUCTION

Charismatic leadership is not one of the prime concerns of modern students of politics. In fact, to my knowledge, no one has seen fit to perform a deep and probing analysis of charisma at both the theoretical and empirical levels. Most of the theoretical material is designed to show that the term "charisma" simply cannot be applied to leaders in the way that Max Weber intended. However, these writers do not often go on to consider the practical emergence of leaders who do in fact possess the qualities to which Weber referred. On the other hand, when the concept is used in the empirical sense to denote the actual occurrence of these kinds of leaders, the user is too often unconcerned with the evidence that he may advance in support of his claims. The term "charisma" is very often used loosely, with little accompanying justification for the usage. Moreover, I have found that occasionally the best evidence is given by authors who ignore charisma and apply the evidence to some other concept. All of these factors do not simplify the problems which must be broached in this thesis.

In the first chapter my intention is to define charismatic leadership in reasonably precise and operational terms. I shall, therefore, assert that there is no reason for rejecting the concept on normative grounds. Secondly, I shall contend that the charismatic phenomenon has existed and does exist as an integral part of the character of certain leaders, both

democratic and undemocratic. This, of course, leads us to the crucial matter of evidence. My contention is that interactional theory provides the best approach to any leadership phenomenon. Thus, a complete and thorough analysis of a charismatic figure would require that I consider the personality of the leader, the needs and attitudes of the followers, and the physical situation within which the leader aspires to power. However, although this is desirable, this kind of total coverage is not possible in this study. For one thing these factors which are part of the interactional theory vary in importance from one leader to another. In addition, in some areas there is simply very little evidence to be obtained. Consequently, I am forced to rely on evidence that is often impressionistic and always incomplete. Admittedly this is a risky procedure. But sometimes the only alternative to taking risks is to remain silent on an important issue. For example, in my assertions concerning Churchill I am obliged to rely extensively on second-hand evidence -- the opinions and observations of others. When I use the opinions of others in this regard I usually do so either because those opinions conform to my own or because they seem to be generally supported by other authors.

Chapter II will include a brief discussion of the conditions or elements of democracy. In addition, I hope to adequately reveal the role of leadership -- and in particular, charismatic leadership -- in the democratic framework. From this I will attempt to show that the ascendance of charismatic leaders

is not accounted for in democratic theory. That is, my contention will be that although charismatic leaders arise in our society, and although they seem to fill a definite need, their presence contravenes many of the tenets which are basic to the democratic way of life. Moreover, as I have implied, charismatic leaders may possess both good and bad features for a democracy.

The final chapter is intended to provide some of the guidelines by which we might maximize the good features of charismatic leadership, and minimize the bad. In general, I will argue that mediocrity and charisma are the two evils of democracy, and that the answer to these is a consistent turnover of strong creative leaders. However, for me, the success of this study will not be measured in terms of the solutions that are provided, rather it will be measured according to the extent to which problems are revealed and the directions of their solutions are exposed.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP

The word "leader" has been defined variously (1) in terms of legitimacy, (2) as the focus for the behavior of group members, (3) in terms of sociometric choice or preference, (4) as having social power or influence over others, and (5) in terms of group syntality -- that is, the groups effectiveness in achieving its goal.¹ Definitions are usually geared to serve the ends for which a particular investigation is planned. Those who are interested in observing the leadership phenomenon in a small group of children are naturally inclined to define the terms in a way which is suitable for their analysis. This is no less true of political leadership; although it should be said that virtually all leadership studies (and therefore definitions) may be seen as having some degree of relevance to what we refer to as political leadership.

"In the broadest sense, leadership refers to that process whereby an individual directs, guides, influences or controls the thoughts, feelings or behavior of other human beings."² Here the emphasis is on social power or influence. In

¹ These methods of defining leadership are handled summarily by C.A. Gibb, "Leadership," in G. Lindzey, (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology Vol. II (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 880-84.

² F.S. Haiman, Groups Leadership and Democratic Action (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1951), p.4.

the political sphere one must add the notion of legitimacy. As Robert Dahl and others have pointed out, political leaders characteristically attempt to become more secure in their social influence by seeking authority -- that is, by seeking to legitimate their influence.³

Gibb's distinction between leadership and headship is relevant to this discussion. According to Gibb, "the leader's authority is spontaneously accorded him by his fellow group members, the followers. The authority of the head derives from some extra-group power which he has over the members of the group, who cannot meaningfully be called his followers."⁴ Thus, the basic difference between these two forms of influence lies in the source of the authority which is exercised. This is surely a distinction that needs to be understood, but it is not one which will be closely adhered to in this study. I do not see how this differentiation can be seen as wholly accurate or useful in a discussion of political leadership. Every political leader tends to rely to some extent on extra-group power or domination. One might contend that democratically elected leaders are "really" leaders as opposed to usurpers, but this need not be the case.

Having said this, however, I might assert that the distinction between a leader and a head is somewhat apropos to the

³ See R. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 19.

⁴ Gibb, op. cit., p. 882.

consideration of charisma. For example, a distinguishing feature of charismatic leaders seems to be that they are least apt to derive power, prestige and authority from formal status. In fact Max Weber's entire notion of the "routinization of charisma" might be seen as analogous to a movement from leadership on the one hand to headship on the other.⁵ These speculations seem to lead to the interesting possibility that charismatic leaders (seen from the Gibbian point of view, and from the point of view of many others who have pondered the nature of leadership) are more genuinely leaders than are other individuals holding equal or superior political authority. This may, in fact, be a point of view which I will be led to assume. We are, however, getting too far afield from our present intention which is to define political leadership. As I have asserted above the distinction between leadership and headship will not be considered as crucial to this definition.

Political leadership, then, is here defined primarily in terms of social influence and legitimacy. Alfred de Grazia takes a similar position when he identifies a political leader as "any occupant of an established political position or any person, in or out of such a position, whose political activity has more influence upon the group's behavior than has the

⁵ From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 262 ff.

activity of the average member."⁶ Legitimacy is here used in reference to an established political office and should be held distinct from that notion of legitimacy which refers to the way in which individuals seek to substantiate their influence. In simplified terms, from the point of view of a paper which is primarily orientated toward an analysis of charismatic leadership, political leadership is probably best defined in terms of social power or influence. However, if one is to easily recognize political leadership, and if one is to distinguish this sort of leadership from others, the notion of a legitimate political office must be introduced. I am, therefore, employing a double-barreled definition of political leadership. The two elements need not be synonymous. However for the purposes of this study only those leaders who occupy an established political position and whose influence is obvious or measurable will be considered as significant. To clarify further, I will attempt to choose as my examples those individuals who hold an established political office and whose influence is based on charisma. I shall then (in Chapter II) discuss this charisma-derived influence in the light of certain democratic tenets. However, this endeavor must await the clarification of the concept of "charisma" and a very cursory discussion of the approach to leadership which will be employed.

⁶ Alfred de Grazia, Politics and Government, Vol.I: Political Behavior (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 82.

The nature of charisma was first defined and place in its political context by Max Weber.

Charisma shall be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed. 'Charismatic authority,' hence, shall refer to a rule over men . . . to which the governed submit because of their belief in the extraordinary quality of the specific person. The magical sorcerer, the prophet, the leader of hunting and booty expeditions, the warrior chieftain . . . 'Caesarist' ruler . . . are such types. . . . The legitimacy of charismatic rule thus rests upon the belief in magical powers, revelations and hero worship. . . . Charismatic rule is not managed according to general norms, either traditional, or rational, . . . and in this sense . . . is 'irrational.' It is 'revolutionary' in the sense of not being bound to the existing order.⁷

Charisma was originally a religious idea denoting one who possessed the "gift of grace" or one who spoke for or enacted the will of God. Thus, in accordance with the original meaning of the word, Jesus Christ and Moses were genuine charismatic leaders. It was Weber's intention, however, to apply the term to political phenomena in its "value-neutral" sense. Weber sought to give the concept a secular twist to denote men who, through personal magnetism, heroism, and other distinctive qualities are immediately and unqualifiedly recognized by the masses as leaders. It is this attempt to broaden the term and employ a value-free analysis that has brought about the scathing criticisms of Carl J. Friedrich, Dorothy Emmet and others.

⁷ Max Weber, in Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 295-96. The italics are Weber's.

Friedrich asserts that "any meaningful political science and sociology including Weber's own is not only not value-free, is not only value-orientated, but is value-concerned."⁸ Weber's tendency to lump all forms of inspirational leadership under the concept of charisma does not allow for the differentiation of "the leadership of a Luther from the leadership of a Hitler." Leaders of great political movements, totalitarian or otherwise, are primarily preoccupied with power, whereas great religious innovators are not. Hence, for Friedrich it was an injustice of the first degree to categorize these differing sorts of leaders together with no concern for the ultimate ends involved. "At any rate," writes Emmet, "if the prophets and founders who can release new resources in others and give them new vision, as well as those who claim blind obedience from devoted followers, are to be described by the same term, it is important to see that they are two very different types."⁹ To me the differences between, say, Hitler and Mohammed are obvious, but I shall hold that these are not factors which invalidate Weber's use of the term "charisma."

Friedrich would have us reject charisma on the grounds that it is confusing and misleading when it is applied to political

⁸ Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power," The Journal of Politics, XXIII (February, 1961), p. 19.

⁹ Dorothy Emmet, Function, Purpose and Power, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1958), p. 235.

leadership. In its place he would substitute "inspirational" leadership stemming from either personal dynamism and demagogic appeal (represented by democratic leaders like Churchill and Roosevelt), or from a leaders utterances of an ideological belief (represented by certain totalitarians like Stalin).¹⁰

Friedrich tends to think that his view is at least partly justified insofar as charismatic leadership is of minor importance in modern political thought. The fact is, however, that charismatic leadership is being quite widely discussed and, moreover, the concept is being applied more in Weberian terms than in the strictly "religious" sense which Friedrich claims to be proper.¹¹ There seems to be a "personal magnetism," a "mystical appeal," an aura of "rightness" and "wisdom" which surrounds certain leaders regardless of the society in which they live. In politics this is something which can be observed and attributed to certain men.

Thus, in this paper charisma is used to describe an appeal which is highly personal, emotional, and largely irra-

¹⁰ Friedrich, op. cit., p. 23.

¹¹ The term seems to be extensively used in reference to events in the emergent African nations. One example of this is E. Shils, "Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," World Politics, XI (October, 1958), pp. 1-19. A contemporary Canadian usage of the concept may be found in Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1963), pp. 60-78.

tional.¹² It is a "magical" appeal which is often expressed in terms of a leader's "mission," his "calling," or his "vision" of a brighter future. This definitional discussion need not involve us in any consideration of moral values. If, as seems to be the case with Weber, one sets out to delineate the common factors which allow one to recognize charisma as one of the "bases of authority," and if charisma is to be ascribed to certain leaders, it can and must be founded in a value-free analysis. However, when it comes to a discussion of this sort of leadership within a particular political system the arguments only become fruitful when evaluative statements are introduced. What I am attempting to do here, therefore, is present a picture of charisma which is free of all notions of "goodness" and "badness." However, in the latter part of this study, when I attempt to analyze the role of charismatic leaders in democratic societies, I will no longer claim ethical neutrality.

In my attempt to define charismatic leadership I am following Max Weber rather closely, but there are ways in which Weber must be expanded and interpreted to meet the needs of this study. Weber recognized three "pure" forms or "ideal types" of authority: (1) charismatic authority, (2) traditional authority, and (3) legal authority.¹³ Pure charismatic authority is directly opposed to all forms of traditional, rational or bureaucratic authority, and

¹² See Appendix A, "A Note on Irrationality."

¹³ Weber, in Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 295 ff.

is foreign to everyday economic and administrative considerations.

Weber writes:

Genuine charismatic domination therefore knows no abstract legal codes and statutes and no 'formal' way of adjudication. Its 'objective' law emanates concretely from the god-like strength of the hero. Charismatic domination means a rejection of all ties to any external order in favor of the exclusive glorification of the genuine mentality of the prophet and hero. Hence, its attitude is revolutionary and transvalues everything; it makes a sovereign break with all traditional or rational norms: 'It is written, but I say unto you.'¹⁴

It seems obvious that pure charisma, as it is set forth by Weber, is a worthless concept in analyzing the leadership of modern industrial societies. This has led some writers, like Schlesinger, to reject charisma as a perfectly useless and "mischievous" concept.¹⁵ Whether Weber actually wanted to maintain the purity of charisma (in analysis), or whether he thought that his notion of "the routinization of charisma"¹⁶ caused the concept to conform sufficiently to reality seems to be a contentious point.¹⁷ However, this is not an argument which needs to be resolved here. In this study charisma is used as an element which may be mixed with varying degrees of traditional and legal authority. Plamenatz, in attempting to refute Schlesinger's reasons

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 250.

¹⁵ See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "On Heroic Leadership," Encounter, XV (December, 1960), p. 6.

¹⁶ Weber, in Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 262 ff.

¹⁷ For example Dahl seems to disagree with Schlesinger in this regard. See Schlesinger, loc. cit., and Dahl, op. cit., p. 29.

for rejecting Weber's term, points out that a Hitler "cannot use power effectively unless he has a bureaucracy under him, and yet his authority does also largely depend on his having what Weber calls charisma."¹⁸ Regardless of other factors, charismatic leaders are those who are obeyed primarily through the people's faith in their extraordinary personal qualities.

There are other terms which have been applied to leadership that are akin to, and in many ways synonymous with, charisma. There seems to be a conscious effort on the part of many writers to shy away from the use of the word.¹⁹ For example, a good deal has been written on the heroic leader. In my view virtually all political heroes demonstrate a considerable degree of charismatic appeal. We may conceive of heroes whose charismatic appeal is nil -- as perhaps one who becomes a hero through the performance of a physical act -- but it is difficult to envisage heroic political leaders who do not depend to some degree upon what I have labeled as charisma.

Charismatic leadership is also closely related to demagoguery. If there is a distinction to be made it must probably

¹⁸ John Plamenatz, "Heroic Leadership?" Encounter, XVII (September, 1961), p. 65.

¹⁹ This is especially evident in Sebastian de Grazia's The Political Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 171-83. Here de Grazia uses the words "mystic," "prophet," "savior," "hero," "missionary," and "messianic" to describe exactly the same phenomenon that we are concerned with, but he never once refers to these sorts of leaders as being charismatic.

be made in terms of ends and methods employed. A demagogue is commonly referred to as one who plays directly upon the emotional prejudices of the masses in order to achieve some obviously selfish end. Moreover, the term seems to be used most often in its value-laden sense to imply some sort of deceptive or fraudulent behavior. Hence, within the context of this thesis those leaders who are normally referred to as demagogues, like Huey Long, and those leaders of the other bent who are usually called statesmen, like Churchill, may all be classified as essentially charismatic.

Finally, charismatic leadership necessarily involves a measure of inspiration. Inspirational leadership, however, need not be charismatic. Consequently those who write in terms of inspirational leadership may be saying something which is significant for the study of charisma, but they are not saying everything that needs to be said. Friedrich, for example, in speaking of inspirational leadership as an alternative to charismatic leadership cannot account for the mystical transcendent quality which is attributed to certain leaders by their followers.

I am, therefore, defining charismatic leadership in terms which are very broad. It is to include elements of heroism, demagoguery and inspirationalism. It is obvious that the concept cannot be employed with pinpoint precision. For one thing, as we have seen in the preceding pages modern charismatics cannot display this characteristic in its pure form -- it is always mixed

with other so-called "bases of authority." Secondly, and as we shall see in the latter portion of this chapter, the charismatic leader is an analytic function of at least three basic ingredients; the leader himself, the followers, and the social situation.

From the above discussion it is evident that there must be degrees or shades of charisma in most political leaders. There is no distinct dividing line which separates the charismatics from the non-charismatics. Thus, when I speak of charismatic leaders in this discourse, to be on the safe side I refer solely to those leaders who are "obviously" charismatic or those who are "most reliant" on the charismatic appeal. This sort of distinction requires that we possess adequate information concerning the leaders in question. Consequently, the leaders to whom I will allude as being charismatic will be mainly figures of international fame, and, secondly, they will all share the distinction of having been successful at some time during their careers. A partial list of such leaders would include Mahatma Gandhi, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, Adof Hitler, Huey Long, V.I. Lenin, Fidel Castro, Charles de Gaulle, and John Diefenbaker.²⁰

²⁰ There is no implication here that leadership studies at the provincial and local levels do not have considerable value. I can envisage great benefits accruing from a rigorous study of a charismatic figure like Harry Viner, the mayor of Medicine Hat, Alberta. This sort of investigation has many advantages over similar efforts on the national and international

At this point one may wish to inquire as to the specific characteristics or features which set this group of leaders apart from others of the modern era who appear to have been equally important and successful. The answer, of course, is that these leaders conform to the defining characteristics which I have set down. However, it is possible to be more precise than this. One may cite specific evidence which indicates that a leader qualifies as charismatic. However, before proceeding with a discussion involving the recognition of actual charismatics I must complete the preliminary methodological deliberations by looking at some of the approaches to the study of leadership. Hopefully this will provide us with the most satisfactory scheme by which any leadership situation may be analyzed. I shall, therefore, return to the practical considerations of evidence as a concluding note to this chapter.

Weber has been accused of using charisma merely as an expression of his nominalistic or Carlylean philosophy of history. Gerth and Mills, for example, write that "Weber's conception of the charismatic leader is a continuation of a 'philosophy of

scene. In the first place the man himself is more available for research purposes than is a national leader. Also, virtually all of his followers may be contacted, tested, and accurately scaled. The social situation which facilitates this sort of leadership can be accurately appraised and accounted for. All in all, this kind of study on the local level would seem to allow for more exact observations, precise tabulations and, therefore, reliable conclusions. Moreover, a close analysis of the basis of Mayor Viner's acceptance might greatly assist our hypothetical and methodological approaches to national charismatic leadership. Another good prospect for this type of investigation might be Mayor Hawrelak of Edmonton.

history' which, after Carlyle's Hero and Hero Worship, influenced a great deal of nineteenth-century history writing. In such an emphasis, the monumentalized individual becomes the sovereign of history."²¹ It is entirely possible that Weber places too much emphasis on the individual. However, this is an argument which may be easily carried to extremes. It is doubtful if Weber was ever as one-sided as he has been interpreted as being. In fact the confusion in this area may be one result of Weber's tendency to set forth "pure" forms and "ideal types" which, by their very nature, tend to suggest an extreme point of view. In this study equal weight is given to group and situational factors underlying the charismatic phenomenon. It may be that Weber's purposes were sufficiently different from our own to cause him to write in such a way that his readers are easily impressed with what seems to be an undue emphasis on the individual.

The significance of political leadership has been the subject of a fundamental, highly speculative, and largely sterile argument which has raged for well over one hundred years. This is the debate between the "cultural determinists" on the one hand and the "great man" theorists on the other. The cultural determinists contend that leaders are created by the interplay of social forces -- that great leadership is determined by the requirements of circumstance. This point of view, which was

²¹ Gerth and Mills, op. cit., p. 53.

initiated and largely supported by such writers as Hegel, Marx and Tolstoi, has found certain implicit support from modern group and situational theorists. The great man theory of leadership is derived principally from the works of Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle contends that leadership is "Providential," that it arises naturally out of certain men who are endowed with goodness, wisdom and valor. "Heroes teach us right and wrong, he said; heroes give us great inventions and discoveries. It is the great few who transform society; the multitude follows them."²² Although Carlyle may go to extremes, his basic argument -- that great leaders have definite inborn qualities which allow them to shape historical events -- finds considerable support among modern writers and leaders.²³

As with the majority of arguments of this kind the most satisfactory position regarding the sources and influence of leadership probably lies somewhere between the two polar points of view. The fact is that we are here interested in both sides of the question. We wish to understand the consequences of the acts of particular men who might be labeled charismatic. This seems to require that my analysis give some consideration to the peculiar combinations of qualities which individuals possess. Also we are seeking to account for the social conditions, the

²² Alfred de Grazia, op. cit., p. 83.

²³ See, for example, E.E. Jennings, An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 88 ff., and pp. 111-12.

environmental factors, that make the rise of such leaders possible or impossible, probable or improbable. In the latter sense I am viewing leaders as being caused. Hence, leaders are both unique and typical and there is little to be gained in claiming that they are either all of one sort or all of the other. To illustrate: Hitler was clearly a product of the social forces within the Weimar Republic. However, Hitler also had characteristics and attitudes which were unique and are best considered as part of the man himself. He had an impact on the history of the world which cannot be explained solely in terms of social and environmental factors. The same can be said of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was a charismatic leader in a democratic state.

There is another way of looking at leadership which may, in this writer's opinion, be the most satisfactory approach of all. This is the system of classification which was suggested by Sidney Hook.²⁴ Hook makes a distinction between an "eventful man" in history and an "event-making man" in history. An eventful man is one who effects the course of events merely by doing his duty -- by being in step with the times. Hook likens the eventful man to the little Dutch boy who saved the town by holding his finger in the hole in the dike. This was an event of great and lasting significance for the community. However, the qualities of the little Dutch boy were not out of the ordinary;

²⁴ Sidney Hook, The Hero in History (New York: The Humanities Press, 1943), pp. 154 ff.

any other boy might have served equally as well. Similarly, Hook sees the Emperor Constantine as merely an eventful man, even though he has been called 'great.'²⁵ Although the change in the Roman Empire from paganism to Christianity was of tremendous importance, for Constantine the decision was simply good politics and did not require that he possess any of the characteristic qualities of greatness.

The event-making man, on the other hand, is able, through extraordinary qualities, to make history; or at least he is able to bend some of the social trends. There are numerous examples of leaders whose ability has allowed them to make a difference in history -- Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon and Hitler are but a few. Hook readily admits that these are loose categories and that there are bound to be categories which operate either in harmony with or in spite of the efforts of the event-making man.

It is interesting to note what appears to be a perfect fit between hook's event-making man and Weber's classic representation of the charismatic leader. Weber depicts charisma as being opposed to all institutional routines, whether they be traditional or merely those which are subject to ratioanl management. A purely charismatic figure is one who is a revolutionary; he is in favor of radical social, political and economic changes; he is one who is most apt to shape history. At a glance,

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 155-56.

it appears as if a charismatic leader, in order to qualify as charismatic, must be an event-making man. However, I must hasten to clarify and qualify this point of view, for as it now stands it simply is not congruent with the way in which charisma is used in this study. A charismatic leader may achieve political power and then fail to implement the policies which are necessary to strengthen the bond with his followers. It seems fair to say that a majority of the event-making men of history have held considerable charismatic appeal. One might go further to contend that all charismatic leaders could be event-making men (good or bad) if they were able to implement the policies or ends which they advocated. Consequently, a charismatic leader may be event-making, eventful, or something less than eventful. In retrospect, it is possible to see all charismatic leaders as fitting quite loosely into one of these categories.

Thus, Hook's classification is a useful one for resolving the age old argument concerning the significance of political leadership -- an argument which has been expressed mainly in terms of the "hero in history." However, these categories are of limited use in the sort of analysis I am attempting here. I must move on, therefore, to clarify what I take to be the most rigorous, operational and satisfactory approach to the study of charismatic leadership.

Charismatic leadership is very often analyzed and most often talked about in terms of the leader's "personality." In fact,

like Moos and Koslin, many writers seem to automatically associate charisma with definite clusters of personality traits.²⁶ For quite some time the study of individual personalities has been a fascinating but unsatisfactory way of looking at the leadership phenomenon. The search for universal personality traits in leaders has therefore largely been displaced by a concern for the needs and influences of the group and the demands of the situation. However, researchers who approach leadership with a firm understanding of relevant group factors and situational aspects may find it necessary and desirable to say a good deal about the personal characteristics of leaders. With these other conditions taken into account researchers may eventually be able to affirm the universality of particular leadership traits.²⁷

In this study I will follow what has been called the "interactional theory" of leadership. Both Sanford and Gibb assert that interactional theory provides the most satisfactory framework within which leadership may be examined. Sanford's approach to the study of leadership starts with the notion that "there are three basic and delineable factors in any leadership phenomena: (a) the leader, (b) the situation, and (c) the follower . . .

²⁶ See Malcolm Moos and Bertram Koslin, "Prestige Suggestion and Political Leadership," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Spring, 1952), pp. 77-78.

²⁷ This idea is pursued by M.G. Ross and C.E. Hendry, New Understandings of Leadership (New York: Association Press, 1957), pp. 29 ff.

(and that) we must ultimately deal -- and deal simultaneously -- with each of these general factors."²⁸ Gibb writes:

Any comprehensive theory of leadership must incorporate and integrate all the major variables which are now known to be involved, namely, (1) the personality of the leader, (2) the followers with their attitudes, needs, and problems, (3) the group itself both as regards (a) structure of interpersonal relations and (b) syntality characteristics, (4) the situation as determined by physical setting, nature of task etc.²⁹

Anything less than the interactional theory is too narrow for our present purposes. There is a tendency on the part of many students to use one of the above variables as an all-inclusive category in terms of which the behavior of all political figures may be explained. As regards charismatic leadership this tendency is most common when charismatic is interpreted as a way of looking at leadership rather than something which is to be analyzed in itself. For example, in the previously cited study by Moos and Koslin charisma is employed as a theory or an approach to leadership which is something apart from or counterdistinct to the interactional theory.³⁰ However, in this study charisma is used as descriptive of certain leadership phenomena. Consequently, far from being an approach to, or theory of, leadership, charisma is something we seek to analyze and explain by utilizing leadership

²⁸ F.H. Sanford, "Leadership Identification and Acceptance," in H. Guetzkow, (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), p. 19.

²⁹ Gibb, op. cit., p. 914.

³⁰ Moos and Koslin, loc. cit.

theory. It will be assumed that all relevant elements of leadership can be taken into account under the three or four general headings which are set forth by Sanford and Gibb. Interactional theory is best equipped to deal with factors which may bear special relevance to charismatic political leadership. Such factors might include the nature of the social organization, the social climate, and value systems, all of which contribute to the determination of leadership patterns. Thus, in Chapter II we will proceed on the supposition that the followers or the group and the social situation are no less important to our analysis than the leader himself.

Adolf Hitler provides the most salient example of a charismatic leader in the twentieth century. Hitler burst the bonds of tradition to become, within his own country, the most popular leader of the modern era. The Nazi warlord exacted a measure of blind obedience from his subjects which is virtually unheard of in advanced industrial nations. Yet the basis of Hitler's widespread support is to be found in what was a highly emotional and largely irrational appeal to the people of Germany. Hitler was a prophet, but unfortunately he was a false prophet. The needs of the people led them to believe his shrill-voiced exhortations that Germany's problems could be solved if they could merely secure more Lebensraum, or if they could rid themselves of the terrible scourge of the Jews. For Hitler all of the ills of the present were the result of past folly. He was the chosen leader, the savior, come to revive Germany to her former greatness.

Sebastian de Grazia has compiled and documented a series of testimonials which give ample evidence of Hitler's charismatic appeal.³¹ Herman Goering refers to Hitler as a "God-send," a "savior," whose rise to power can be explained only in terms of some supernatural authority.³² Germany felt the need for a miracle. The people felt a need for a new order to replace the inept Weimar Republic. Hitler promised to be a miracle-worker. His prophetic words issued forth a new self-confidence, built a new belief system, built a nation of souls convinced of this man's superhuman ability to lead them out of the wilderness into terrestrial paradise. "Hitler you are our man." Hitler was their man for reasons which few could explain with any degree of clarity or sensibility. Hitler was their man because he had that transcendent quality which people were ready and willing to accept. He was charismatic.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose power was always contained by his own convictions as a democrat and by the limits placed upon him by American democratic traditions and institutions, achieved the presidency through an appeal which was similar to Hitler's. Roosevelt represented a revolt against the established way of doing things. He advocated the New Deal at a time when

³¹ Sebastian de Grazia, The Political Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 171 ff. Much of de Grazia's evidence is reproduced in Appendix B.

³² Herman Goering, Germany Reborn (London: Mathews and Marrot, Ltd., 1934), p. 80.

people were sufficiently disillusioned to accept radical measures of reform.

De Grazia gives evidence of the emotional responses elicited from people concerning the death of President Roosevelt.³³ The testimonials indicate that F.D.R. was viewed very much as a savior. People were plunged into a state of hopelessness and disorder with his death. Many saw the world as doomed and life as hardly worth living. Sanford found that Roosevelt's tremendous popularity was a result of a perceived combination of great personal warmth and strong authority.³⁴ To the extent that he succeeded in fulfilling American aspirations Roosevelt's charismatic authority was strengthened. Most of F.D.R.'s followers, either consciously or unconsciously, spoken or unspoken, seemed to view him as a good deal more than a mortal man.

In this connection there are two points which ought to be mentioned, although they will be considerably elaborated in later chapters. First, the death of a ruler often reveals that he had a great deal more charismatic appeal than was formerly evident. In the case of Roosevelt, for example, it seems clear that he held an emotional bond with many who were not known to be his followers, and that those who were recognized as his followers were more blindly devoted and therefore more emotionally affected by his

³³ Sebastian de Grazia, op. cit., pp. 114-15.

³⁴ F.H. Sanford, "Public Orientation to Roosevelt," Public Opinion Quarterly, XV (Summer, 1951), pp. 212 ff.

death than would normally be expected.³⁵ Secondly, all political offices which are of some importance seem to possess a measure of latent charisma at all times. Persons who aspire to these positions of leadership are expected to have abilities and qualities which exceed those of ordinary mortals. However, there are leaders like Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill and Diefenbaker whose primary character is charismatic. It is these individuals, whose charisma goes beyond that acquired by merely obtaining a political position, that we are here concerned with in an exemplary fashion.

For years Winston Churchill had sought to warn the world of the impending Nazi threat, and for years his words fell on deaf ears. Only when the climax had reached its climax was Churchill given a complete hearing, and only then did widespread acceptance of his personal ability begin to take root. Churchill's emotional appeals and defiant speeches aroused and reassured the British masses. He seemed to instil the people with strength, confidence and faith. Churchill is a good example of the relationship between a primarily charismatic leader and a crisis situation. It is often said that Churchill's chances of becoming Prime Minister without the Second World War were slim.

John Diefenbakers rapid ascent to power and his equally rapid decline seems to be a classic example of what happens when a charismatic leader is unable to routinize or consolidate his

³⁵ See Ibid., pp. 191 ff., and Sebastian de Grazia, op. cit., p. 115.

position. Diefenbaker achieved power partly on the strength of his famous "vision" for a new Canada or a "Canada of the North." His appeal was largely emotional, partly irrational, and was very often riddled with inconsistencies and exaggerations. Diefenbaker was very much the "anti-establishment" type. He sought to implement some sort of an emotional bond with the "average man." He did all he could to facilitate the public's perception of a crisis situation. Whenever he mounted the speakers rostrum Diefenbaker assumed an air of inspired revelation that seemed to rub off on the people. John Diefenbaker was given the largest measure of support ever accorded to a Canadian Prime Minister. It may be that his speedy political descent in 1962 came partly as a direct result of an obvious gap between his emotional charismatic appeal and his performance while in office.³⁶

³⁶ See Appendix B for specific documented evidence of charisma in the four aforementioned leaders -- Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill and Diefenbaker.

CHAPTER II

LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

The fundamentals of a democratic system may be expressed in either normative or operational terms. That is, democratic principles may be set down in such a way as to give reasonable grounds for a system being the way it is, or the principles may simply explain observable factors which characterize the system. In this study the fundamentals of a democracy are expressed in both of the above ways. Once understood, the distinction becomes somewhat less than crucial, for more often than not normative and operational considerations are inseparable in any meaningful manner. The following discussion of the principles of the democratic system is derived primarily from the work of H.B. Mayo,¹ Bernard Berelson,² and J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham.³

What I shall attempt to do here is strike a happy medium between, say, Mayo whose overriding concern is the formulation of broad all-inclusive principles on the theoretical level, and Berelson who seeks to set forth the underlying conditions or assumptions of democracy which are researchable -- that is, those which may be more exactly understood and clarified through

¹ H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 66 ff.

² Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Fall, 1952), pp. 313-30.

³ J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham, Elements of Democratic Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 25 ff.

modern research techniques. Hence, the following elements of democratic theory are in the form of very rough categorizations, with no attention being paid to their order of importance. Moreover, several of the ideals which are stated as part of one category may fit equally well into some other category. In fact, in some instances points are merely restated in different terms, indicating the complexity and interrelatedness of the tenets of democratic thought. These categories are not logically watertight. The important thing is that most of the common or accepted elements of the democratic system are listed in a more or less orderly fashion.

(1) The first and perhaps best known principle of democracy is that of equality. In order of importance, the principle of equality takes the two following forms: political equality and legal equality. What I am least concerned with is arguments involving social and economic equality. It may be that democracy cannot function in the presence of extreme social and economic inequalities. Also it may be, as I believe, that, in general, movements toward more social and economic equality are good or desirable. However, this sort of equality is not what I take to be one of the main distinguishing features of a democracy. It is entirely possible that some dictatorships have a greater degree of social and economic equality than certain democracies. In this area ideas are too numerous and too contentious to warrant consideration here. However, it should be emphasized that when it

comes to a discussion of leadership in a democracy I may return to notions which I have formerly discarded as being somewhat less than basic to the system. For example, we may find that the place of leadership in democratic theory has been affected by a perverted notion of equality as it relates to the democratic system.⁴

Political equality refers primarily to equality in voting. Equal voting privileges include at least the following elements: (1) universal adult suffrage; (2) equal weight is attached to each vote; (3) each person has only one vote; and, (4) the number of representatives (from a party, for example) is directly proportional to the number of votes cast for them.⁵ Another aspect of political equality is that which entitles all men to take an active part in political life, and to run for and hold political office. Legal equality simply means that the law should be applied equally to all people. Laws should not discriminate between individuals regardless of their station.

(2) Democracy involves a large measure of individual and political freedom. The need for freedom is usually justified on the grounds that it is a necessary condition for the fulfilment

⁴ By writing this paragraph I hope to have averted the age old problem of reconciling liberty and equality. My present purposes do not seem to require that we become involved in such a debate.

⁵ These points are presented in somewhat similar order by Mayo, op. cit., p. 63.

of one's personality. This, in turn, is desirable because it leads to a rich and rewarding life. For many, like Corry and Abraham, respect for the human personality is an overriding ideal which acts as a criterion for mediating all conflicts between subordinate ideals.⁶ Thus, liberty and equality, freedom and order, are reconciled in terms of what is best for the healthy stimulation and development of human personalities. This is, in my view, a sound method of justifying democratic tenets. It is, however, an ideal which is too broad and general to be included as one of our principal elements. Nevertheless, within certain categories we will occasionally mention the respect for human personality as an important component of democratic ideology.

Political freedom implies a free choice in the election of the individuals who are to govern. This, of course, must be accompanied by a general freedom of all citizens to stand for election if they so desire. A free choice is useless unless it is a meaningful choice -- unless there are at least two candidates of different tenor. There are other forms of political freedom which have become the byword of democracy. Since ancient times democrats have insisted that they be accorded the freedom to speak, organize, and assemble. Mayo asserts one freedom which he holds to be the most crucial test of the democratic nature of a country. This is the freedom to oppose. Effective opposition is made

⁶ See Corry and Abraham, op. cit., pp. 28 ff.

possible by realization of the liberties which are stated above. Mayo writes: "The touchstone of a democratic system is political freedoms, opposition, and parties."⁷

(3) The third principle or assumption of democracy is rationality. I am mainly concerned here with the way in which members of the electorate arrive at political decisions. Theory has it that the endurance of a democratic system depends upon the electorate carefully weighing the facts and arriving at rational decisions. If men generally are irrational,⁸ and if there is no reason for us to assume that rational decisions can be attained, then the principle of majority rule falters and becomes ineffectual. This is not to say that all citizens of a democracy are or should be rational -- far from it. Voting studies tend to indicate that the vast majority of the people are not rational in their political decision-making. The important questions seem to be, To what extent does the electorate follow a non-rational pattern of behavior? and, Upon what grounds are their decisions judged as non-rational? Studies show that many people vote according to custom or habit, and by most definitions this is termed as a non-rational act. However, I am prepared to argue that a stable democracy requires a fair proportion of people whose main voting criterion is custom or habit. In this sense non-rational voters are

⁷ Mayo, op. cit., p. 66.

⁸ See Appendix A, "A Note on Irrationality."

desirable for maintaining an effective opposition. There is, of course, a point where this sort of decision-making is carried to extremes and the desirability ends. However, there are other forms of non-rational acts which simply cannot be justified in a democracy. For example, democracy can ill afford decisions that are erratic in nature and are based primarily on emotional impulses. Every country contains these sorts of non-rational decision-makers, but it is a condition that should not be general if democracy is to flourish.

Berelson suggests several further requirements which are somewhat related to rationality and which are definitely elements of the electoral decision-making process. Democratic theory assumes accurate observation on the part of the electorate: ". . . the electorate is required to perceive political realities clearly and objectively, with an absence or only a small amount of subjective distortion."⁹ However, many people have a distorted perception of political events and issues which allows them to unconsciously alter their views to correspond to the official opinions of political affiliations -- as, for example, with political parties. Probably some degree of misperception or self-induced unawareness is necessary for people to get along politically. However, persistent and increasing misperceptions of political reality, particularly in a crisis situation, carries interesting implications for democracy and democratic leadership.

⁹ Berelson, loc. cit., p. 321.

Another requirement which is closely related to accurate observation and which plays an explicit role in rational decision-making is the possession by the electorate of information and knowledge.¹⁰ This requirement is particularly difficult to handle, for research has shown that the public is not well informed on current political issues, and much of the information and knowledge which is possessed is used to reinforce existing beliefs rather than as a catalyst for creative decisions. However, this is an assumption which is usually made concerning democracies, and it seems clear that there must be a minimum level of general information and knowledge below which the democratic process is seriously imperilled. What seems to be needed in this area, ~~us~~ in others, is that theorists refine and clarify and particularize their concepts, with some attention being paid to what we already know about the electorate.

The final related proposition, which is also suggested by Berelson,¹¹ requires that the electorate engage in communication and discussion concerning political affairs. This may be the most problematic requirement of all. As Berelson points out, the individuals who "communicate" and "discuss" the most are those who are least apt to change their minds. It seems clear that democratic electorates must have a certain capacity to communicate in

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 317 ff.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 322 ff.

order to become informed. However, the very nature of political discussion makes it a difficult requirement to justify. "We cannot inquire here into what the requirements of discussion can really mean in a modern democracy; whether self-interested argument is improper, whether genuine discussion goes on a different level in the political process. But certainly democratic practise does not conform fully to the requirements of some theorists . . ."¹²

(4) Our fourth and most specific principle is the near universal requirement that decision-makers -- both electors and representatives -- abide by the rulings of the majority. It is assumed that the majority of the representatives always represents a majority of the electors, and any decision which receives more than fifty per-cent support from the legislators must therefore command majority support of the populace. With regard to majority rule Mayo cites three minimum rules which must be followed if democracy is to function satisfactorily.¹³ First, a majority must function within the framework of political and individual freedoms. Above all, a majority must not use its authority to silence opponents by abolishing their political liberties. Second, a minority must yield to the will of the majority until it is able, by peaceful political means, to take over as the majority.

¹² Ibid., p. 324.

¹³ Mayo, op. cit., p. 68.

Third, once a minority attains office it too must agree to maintain the political liberties of its opposition.¹⁴ Majority rule involves a reversible relationship; if it is to function properly both majority and minority parties must agree on the above formally stated rules.

(5) The fifth and final formulation is broad, general, and very much of a catchall category. Democracy implies popular control of government in accordance with the principle of constitutionalism. It is obvious that many of the principles that have been mentioned so far may be neatly subsumed under the ideal of popular control of policy-makers. Nevertheless, these latter ideals are well suited as a concluding note for our categories. In many ways popular control best sums up the end that democrats are ~~striving~~ for, and constitutionalism expresses the best method for achieving and preserving that goal.

Popular control of representatives is accomplished through elections held at more or less regular intervals. To this universal democratic requirement Mayo adds three clarifying statements which bear paraphrasing.¹⁵ (1) Voters may not decide public policies directly at elections. Their control may be indirect through the representatives they elect. (2) Public influence upon policies is a constant and recognized factor in democratic systems. The

¹⁴ This may be seen merely as an extension or elaboration of the first rule. There is no crucial hidden distinction here.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 62.

effect of the popular will is felt in numerous ways, the influence of pressure groups perhaps being the best known. (3) Underlying the notion of popular control is the idea of "popular sovereignty." The supposition here is that all genuine authority derives directly from the people. However, it remains true that numerous despots have claimed, and do claim, that their authority stems ultimately from the people. Popular sovereignty, therefore, is only a meaningful democratic tenet when it is accompanied by institutionalized safeguards which guarantee free elections at fairly regular intervals.

A concern with safeguards leads naturally to the ideal of constitutionalism. ". . . constitutionalism is a means for achieving the ideal of rule by law. But in the democratic world the constitution -- be it written or an unwritten one -- has become a symbol around which men who are in disagreement on other points can be rallied."¹⁶ The constitution embodies a fundamental law which lays down the form and functions of the organs of government, and defines the limits of the relationship between government and the private citizen. In many ways constitutionalism leads to a dispersal of controls and a degree of political turbulence which is baffling to the non-democratic outsider.

There are several more significant assumptions which I might note as prominent elements of popular control and consti-

¹⁶ Corry and Abraham, op. cit., p. 39.

tutionalism. It is often asserted that a democratic citizen must possess political interest in general and must be in sympathy with or cognizant of the community interest when he casts his ballot.¹⁷ It is commonly assumed that there is a minimum level of political involvement and participation below which freedom and democracy are in jeopardy. It may be argued, of course, that apathy is a sign of contentment, and intense or highly motivated interest can only impede the democratic processes insofar as it lessens the possibility of compromise. These considerations need only be mentioned here, for they have interesting implications for charismatic leadership and will be explored in more depth in the concluding chapter.

The assumption which requires that each member of the electorate consider the common interest instead of, or as well as, his own interest derives classical expression from the pen of John Stuart Mill:

In any political election, . . . the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public not his private advantage, and give his vote, to the best of his judgement, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were the sole voter, and the election depended on him alone.¹⁸

The notion of the common good is the core of the classical theory of democracy. Consequently, attacks upon classical democratic

¹⁷ See, for example, Berelson, loc. cit., pp. 316-17, and pp. 327ff.

¹⁸ John Stuart Mill, Representative Government (London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1960), p. 300.

theory have centered around the problem of recognizing and defining the common good. For modern researchers it might be better, as Berelson suggests, to ignore the common good and concentrate on forces making for political cleavage and consensus within the community.¹⁹ A more thorough discussion of classical theory must await our analysis of the place of leadership in democratic doctrine.

Berelson further suggests that "within a range of variations, the electorate is required to possess the types of character which can operate effectively, if not efficiently, in a free society."²⁰ It seems clear that certain individuals have personality structures which are well disposed toward the successful operation of a democratic society. There is no doubt that the elements of a "democratic character," and the extent to which these sorts of characters are necessary in a democratic society, are fields where extensive research may be done. However, for the present there does not seem to be sufficient reliable evidence of the relationship between personality structures and democratic societies to be of much assistance in the study of charismatic leadership.²¹

¹⁹ Berelson, loc. cit., pp. 328-29.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 315.

²¹ Berelson (pp. 315-16) cites several studies which he takes to be a good beginning in the study of the relationship of personality to democratic society. I agree that these investigations form a useful starting point, but extreme caution must be exercised in interpreting their significance. For example, Berelson cites the Lewin and Lippitt experiments as indicating

I will conclude our brief discussion of the fundamentals of democratic society with a few comments on economic well-being as it relates to the functioning of democracy. It is often assumed that a marked degree of affluence is necessary if a country is to have a successful democratic government. It is certainly true that under conditions of extreme poverty the ideals of democracy become insignificant in the daily struggle for subsistence. Excessive privation may strip the beneficial results of freedom of all their meaning. Hence, democracy may depend upon at least a subsistence level of economic well-being. Economics, however, does not form the basis for a major criterion of democracy. Some of the poorest countries in the world are democratic, while some of the richest are non-democratic. Anything beyond the subsistence level is not wholly meaningful as a requirement for democracy. This is not to say that economic factors do not have a good deal of bearing on democratic values and the democratic process itself. On the con-

that "'democratic character' is more flexible and adaptable than the authoritarian character." (p. 316) In the first place, without denying the truthfulness of Berelson's assertion, this seems to be a rather broad interpretation of the research. Secondly, since this study and others involved small groups its relevance may be greatly decreased at the level of large-scale political organizations. One reason for this is that there is not likely to be any direct communication between the leader and the group at the political level. Hence, without overly decrying modern research efforts in the leadership field one must invoke caution into any surveillance of our present accumulated knowledge. The above cited leadership research was first reported in K. Lewin, R. Lippitt and R.K. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates,'" The Journal of Social Psychology, X (1939), pp. 271-99.

trary, Huey Long's near dictatorship in Louisiana may be attributed in part to the poor economic conditions in that state. As this suggests, economic conditions may be of some consequence for charismatic leaders.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the role of leadership in democratic theory, with special references to the charismatic misfit. The following preliminary discussion is intended to merely acquaint the reader with what I take to be a crucial part of the leadership problem. Much of the elaboration is preserved for the final chapter where I attempt to assess proposals which have been advanced to strengthen and clarify the leadership phenomenon in the democratic system. Hence, what follows is merely introductory, or groundwork for future development.

As we have seen democracy embodies a strong concern for the mass of the people. Without "the people" democracy is nothing. Classical theory holds that a democracy is a system in which the people ultimately decide the common good, and their will is supposedly carried out by an elected assembly. Thus, classical doctrine implies that there is a common good which may be recognized and sought after. This is the standard flaw in the doctrine, for as Schumpeter points out, "there is no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by force of rational argument."²² Furthermore, even

²² Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 250.

if society could agree on certain common aims it is highly improbable that agreement could be reached on the method by which these aims should be achieved. Hence, the failure of the common good spells doom for the utilitarian concept of the will of the people. For even if individual desires and opinions formed definite data for the democratic process to work with, and if everyone was willing to act on them with perfect rationality, it does not necessarily follow that these individual volitions could be moulded into anything that might convincingly be called the will of the people. Schumpeter shows that Napoleon I of France through a number of master strokes reconciled the irreconcilable and came closer to the over-all will of the people than any democratic form of government could have hoped to do.²³

Thus, classical democratic theory begins with the common good and political action is seen emanating from the public will as it is enacted through elected assemblies. My purpose here is to demonstrate that this emphasis on the will of the people tends to greatly minimize the role of strong directive leadership. Most democratic theory, according to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., is derived from Locke²⁴ who called on the people to assert their rights by revolutionary means. This action did not demand any special

²³ Ibid., p. 255.

²⁴ One may quarrel with Schlesinger's preoccupation with Locke both as a democrat and as the originator of most democratic thought. Rousseau and Bentham, for example, may be seen as more genuinely democratic than was Locke.

role for leadership. "The Lockian assumption was that the people were endowed with sufficient purpose and intelligence to produce out of themselves, so to speak, an initiative necessary both for successful revolution and for effective government thereafter."²⁵ This assumption leaves little room for the heroic leader whose appeal, I suggest, is based largely upon charisma.

Classical democratic theory, then, considerably minimizes the role of leadership. Virtually all of the emphasis is placed on the role of individual voters and the majority. It assumes that in order for a system to be democratic some sort of majority will must be constantly and effectively exercised. This, of course, is not to say that the classical doctrine has not been revised. Schumpeter, for example, redefines democracy as that "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."²⁶ This reformulation, in Schumpeter's view, takes account of the vital fact of leadership. It does not begin with the will of the people. It takes the initiative away from the electorate and gives it to the leaders. It is an admission that the people cannot rule themselves, and that their proper role is to produce a government by judging those who are best qualified.

²⁵ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "On Heroic Leadership," Encounter, XV, No.6 (December, 1960), p. 3.

²⁶ Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269.

Schumpeter's redefinition is widely accepted among modern democratic theorists. Practically all democratic thinkers acknowledge the democratic method as being one in which individuals or minorities compete for the sanctioned authority to rule the political community. However, although the advantages of the above assertion over the classical notion are obvious, it does not solve all the problems involved in democratic leadership. It remains true that democratic thought has resisted any completely satisfactory emphasis on leadership. This may be the result of more or less inherent democratic values or modes of thought. Or the apparent distrust of leadership may be a carry-over from classical doctrine -- from the theoretical roots of the democratic system. A leader-follower relationship, for example, seems to somehow question the competence of the majority. It suggests that there may be more wisdom in the decisions of one man or a few men than there is in the decisions of the majority of the population. A system which condones and even encourages the existence of leading minorities is somewhat less than democratic; for these minorities are in patent contradiction to a system which is supposed to hinge on majorities. Furthermore, the idea that one person ought to lead while others follow seems to deny some very rudimentary notions of equality. Equalitarian and majoritarian ideals are very much the sacred cows of most democrats. Consequently, although we may be able to lay down principles of equality and majority rule which are in no apparent

conflict with the leadership phenomenon (as I attempted to do earlier in this chapter) it does not follow that all citizens within a democracy will possess so refined a view of the elements of their system. I am not contending that democratic theorists have been at fault for setting forth a kind of equality which does not allow for leadership. Such theorists would be anarchists. However, I would point an accusing finger at many educators, politicians, and ordinary citizens who seem to have strange notions of the kind of equality they possess.

There seems to be at least a grain of truth in Schlesinger's assertion that when the people must choose between competing persons for control of the state, "then the inescapable drift of democratic theory is against investing too much significance in any particular competitor."²⁷ When two political opponents are presenting significantly different points of view, neither opinion is likely to be dead right or dead wrong. Since the electorate must choose between the competitors, and since it is never simply a matter of choosing the one who is telling the truth over the one who is lying (and thereby being right all the time), it is only logical for the electorate to institute some sort of safeguard against making the wrong, or least wise, choice. Inasmuch as the members of the electorate can never be absolutely sure that one contender is right and the other is wrong they cannot afford to

²⁷ Schlesinger, loc. cit., p. 4.

place too much importance in either competitor.

Schlesinger contends that the most important point is that emphasis on leadership has appeared to encourage the erosion of democracy.²⁸ This is reinforced by a tendency among those who appeal for stronger leadership to begin their argument by claim- that majorities are incompetent and the mass of the people is ignorant and unstable. This has caused the concept of leadership to become thoroughly entrenched in the elitist philosophies. In the hands of the elitists leadership has taken on the appearance of a weapon geared to the destruction of democracy.²⁹ History demonstrates that the fears of leadership theory are not unfounded. More often than not the tirades against the weakness and ineffectuality of democracy have led to the suspension of freedoms. Abse and Jessner point out that it is a frequent tendency for anti-authoritarianism to become anti-leadership. It is common in group doctrine for one to be highly suspicious of a strong personality or a man with ideas. A lack of toleration or "a demand for conformity often prevents those who come bearing gifts from taking leadership or even getting involved in public affairs."³⁰

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ In this regard see Thomas Carlyle's passionate plea for leadership which I have quoted as a lead page, immediately preceding Chapter I.

³⁰ A.W. Abse and L. Jessner, "The Psychodynamic Aspects of Leadership," in S.R. Graubard and G. Holton, (eds.), Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 89.

It may be argued that several writers have asserted that democracy has a functional need of very strong and vigorous leaders. This is certainly true. However, no one, to my knowledge, has presented a well integrated theory of leadership and democracy. Most scholars merely state their democratic beliefs, setting aside a section near the end of their monograph in which they express the need for leadership along with a few of the alleged problems in fulfilling this need. Rousseau argues that in some cases it will be necessary for a supremely wise legislator to establish the laws and institutions of a new state.³¹ In some instances the legislator may have to invoke divinity into the laws in order to get the people to accept them. Furthermore, there may be occasions when corruption and lawlessness have reached a point where the state is in danger of perishing, and it will be necessary to "nominate a supreme ruler, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority."³² Hence, in these two instances Rousseau is recommending the pursuit of energetic leadership. However, for Rousseau these are emergency measures, and the general will is never too far in the background. He makes no allowance for continuing vigorous leadership in his general theory. In a similar vein Lippmann, in The Public Philosophy, decries the

³¹ J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1958), pp. 32-35.

³² Ibid., pp. 102-104.

failures of democratic leadership in foreign affairs.³³ But Lippmann does not take any great pains to explain how "wise" democratic leadership is to be recruited.³⁴

Alfred de Grazia sets down what he considers to be "seven of the most significant conditions of democracy."³⁵ His sixth condition is simply the "undervaluation of political leaders." It is most significant that de Grazia considers this to be one of the prime distinguishing characteristics of a democratic system. In de Grazia's view it is typical of democrats that they should neither listen to nor venerate their leaders. "Yet it is probable that this condition is an inescapable one; a democracy in which the political leadership is regarded with profound respect, is harkened to, and is obeyed with great confidence is unthinkable."³⁶ This seems to suggest that to the democratic mind all leadership is evil -- albeit a necessary evil.

It is my contention that charismatic leadership, as opposed to non-charismatic leadership, is even more offensive to democratic philosophic sensibilities than the above discussion

³³ Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Toronto: The New American Library, 1955), pp. 27-29.

³⁴ I am not being entirely fair to Lippmann in leaving it at this, but more shall be said concerning his "solutions" in the final chapter.

³⁵ Alfred de Grazia, Politics and Government, Vol I: Political Behavior (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 308-14.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 313.

implies. Here the irrational and emotional elements enter into the picture. It seems reasonable to assert that those leaders who rely to the greatest extent upon charisma ought to be the most repulsive to the ideals of a democratic society. These leaders not only offend the common ideals of equality and majority rule, but by the very nature of the appeal they tend to deny the theoretical democratic method of objectively weighing the facts and arriving at a public decision, fraught with wisdom, through the employment of reason. In a word, these leaders seem to contradict our third fundamental of democracy -- rationality. Strong charismatic leaders do arise in Western democracies, but we cannot explain their ascendance by looking at the theoretical underpinnings of these societies.

A charismatic leader tends to arise in the wake of a crisis situation. In times of economic and social turmoil the average man cannot rationally grasp the factors which are the cause of his misery and distress. When the proper social and psychological conditions are set men are liable to turn to a "savior" or an all-wise leader who promises to lead them out of the wilderness. Sebastian de Grazia describes the conditions out of which charismatics arise in terms of "ideological disintegration," and "acute anomie." "Out of a disturbance in the reigning belief system anomie arises, a mental tension which in its moderate type reveals an intermittent apprehension in the adult of a danger before which he is helpless and which in its severe type mounts to

an anxiety fraught with terrifying images of a menacing world."³⁷ This was surely the situation in the Weimar Republic prior to Hitler, in the United States prior to Franklin Roosevelt, and in Britain prior to Churchill. In one sense this is the dilemma of democracy. By ignoring leadership democracies have tended to encourage crises. This seems to be precisely Lippmann's point when he argues that World War Two could have been averted if there had not been a lack of vigorous and convincing leadership in the Western democracies.³⁸

This leads us to the final point concerning the ways in which charismatic leadership contravenes the theory of democracy. Charismatic leaders are less susceptible to popular control than are other kinds of leaders. Charismatic leaders arising out of a crisis situation command the sort of blind devotion that is easily abused and converted into absolute control. They may receive such a wide measure of support as to impede and deaden the normal democratic processes. The extent of devotion and emotional attachment may reach proportions which cause significant numbers of people to assume that the leader's authority is derived from something other than the people themselves. Popular sovereignty may be forgotten, and the leader may assume an aura of supernatural

³⁷ Sebastian de Grazia, op. cit., p. xi. Also in this regard, much of the evidence which is presented in Appendix B is relevant.

³⁸ Lippmann, op. cit., pp. 26 ff.

authority.³⁹ This seems to be a danger which is peculiarly charismatic. There are strong, vigorous, and aggressive leaders who do not pose problems for the requirement of popular control -- Harry Truman, for example.

I might conclude this chapter with what appears to be the sharpest possible contrast between the charismatic phenomenon and democratic theory. We must hark back to Alfred de Grazia's notion that one of the main characteristics of a democratic system is its tendency to underestimate the worth of political leaders.⁴⁰ De Grazia terms it "unthinkable" that political leaders in a democracy should elicit respect, attention, and obedience. Yet these are precisely the responses which charismatic leaders are able to evoke. Charismatic leaders are listened to, and to the extent to which they are able to solve current problems they are obeyed and are regarded with profound respect. It seems clear, therefore, that there is an amazing discontinuity between what the elements of democracy seem to allow for and what actually happens when an overt charismatic leader rises to power.

³⁹ See, for example, many of the testimonials in Appendix B.

⁴⁰ See above, p. 49.

CHAPTER III

THE DANGERS: MEDIOCRITY AND CHARISMA

Briefly, in summarized form, these are the arguments that are crucial to the conclusion of this thesis. In the first place, charismatic leaders do arise in democratic societies. Moreover, these leaders arise in apparent noncompliance with many of the common tenets of democracy. Charismatic leaders arise most often, but not always, out of a crisis situation. In addition, crisis situations are greatly facilitated by weak and indecisive leadership. In fact, I might even go beyond what I have formerly asserted to suggest that weak leaders in themselves tend to stimulate the ascendance of a charismatic figure.

Charismatic leaders are undesirable insofar as they are erosive of democracy. Mediocre leaders are undesirable for several reasons, one of which is that they foster the rise of charismatics. Hence, for me, that which avoids the extremes of mediocrity and charisma is good. In my view these extremes may be averted by a democracy which consistently demands and produces strong and vigorous leaders. Hence, in this chapter I am looking for those areas that seem to hold the greatest promise of strengthening democratic leadership. With regards to my contention that strong leaders are good, there are those who would argue that a solid procession of strong leaders might have disastrous effects for democracy. This,

however, is doubtful. Even if I were led to admit that a succession of strong leaders could have bad effects, I would still contend that next to the bad effects of mediocre and charismatic leaders these are quite insignificant. Moreover, I would assert that in all probability the process by which we would be able to regularly produce strong leaders will in itself tend to eliminate the possibility of undesirable effects.

Most thoughtful scholars who have taken the time to consider democratic leadership seem to fall roughly into one of the three following categories. (1) There are those who contend that democracies need strong leadership and are not getting it. (2) There are those who argue that democracies need strong leadership and they are getting it only occasionally, through no fault of their own. (3) Finally, there are some who assert that democracies need strong leadership and that is what they are getting. My position in this study comes nearest to the middle category. I believe that democracies need strong leadership but there is no apparent provision which consistently allows the best men to rise to positions of power. It is doubtful if many people would adhere exactly to the first or the last positions which are outlined above. Generally, those who contend that democracies are not getting satisfactory leadership point to one field, like foreign relations, or else they admit that great leaders occasionally arise quite by accident. Those who fall into our third category usually argue that the leaders are strong but the issues are extremely complex and events are almost incomprehensible. Failures are more a product

of the times than of poor leadership. This may contain a grain of truth, but to me it appears that a position which holds that democratic leaders are consistently good is untenable.

A most striking -- but not surprising -- fact is that all modern democratic thinkers are agreed that democracies need vigorous and convincing leadership. This, of course, is not necessarily inconsistent with my earlier assertions that theory has been inadequate insofar as leadership is concerned. To merely recognize a need for leadership as most scholars do does not, in my opinion, take positive account of the leadership factor within the theory of democracy. That is, to merely recognize the need is not enough when theorists are expounding tenets that are, as I have already indicated, disparaging to the element of leadership. It is possible to group writers according to the way in which they seek to emphasize or concentrate upon the leadership phenomenon. Their observations and recommendations are usually included in one or more of the following areas.

(1) Some authors attempt to emphasize the process by which leaders are chosen. In this instance modern critics maintain that if we have failed to consistently produce wise leaders it may be a result of the democratic method of selecting leaders -- through the election process itself, and pre-election practices like primaries, conventions, etc.

(2) Other writers lay considerable stress on the leaders or the opinion-makers of a democratic society. Leaders are often

accused of being too concerned with their public image and staying in power, and not concerned enough with leading the nation. This is often accompanied by a plea that leaders develop some sort of public conscience or professional ethic regarding their obligations. Also in this regard, there are those who argue that democratic leaders are too much afraid of that mystical entity called "public opinion." In this case it is held that the public is much more enlightened and tolerant of forthright leadership than the leaders themselves assume.

(3) Thirdly, many scholars suggest that most of the problems of leadership center around the shortcomings of the public. The charge most often made here is that the electorate is apathetic and disinterested, and therefore deserves leadership which is somewhat less than satisfactory. In addition it is argued that vigorous leadership is impeded by a public which cannot wholly comprehend intricate political policy, and which will defeat leaders at the polls if they try to implement policies which are too far in advance of public opinion.

(4) Our fourth area -- like the fifth -- many include elements of the first three. Several writers contend that leadership may be significantly affected by the relationship between democratic theory and practice. That is, it is argued that when there is a significant difference between the way people believe the democratic system works and the way it actually works, leadership is adversely affected. Authors who adhere to this point of view may, for example,

find democratic theory deficient insofar as it fails to account adequately for democratic elites. This may lead to an attempt to modify our theoretical notions more in accordance with democratic political practices within which elites play a major role.

(5) Finally, students concerned with leadership may emphasize the differences between nations in terms of their cultures, customs, traditions, history, and institutions. In all likelihood these factors will account for very significant differences between the democratic governments of, say, North America, Continental Europe, and India. It is obvious that traditional, cultural, and historical data may only help us to understand the differences between regions and the leadership problems within regions; for within this area only the institutions can be changed to accommodate more appropriate leadership.

As the title of this chapter suggests, I believe there are two dangers embodied in democratic leadership -- mediocrity and charisma -- both of which tend to compound the bad effects of the other. The point here is that distrust of leadership and a reaction against leadership may lead to an absence of leadership. Moreover, as I have intimated before, mediocrity merely helps to create situations and needs among the people which facilitate the rise of charismatic leaders. By and large these two characteristics represent the extremes of democratic leadership. They are extremes, however, which very often prevail. Mediocre leaders may be elected because they are inoffensive, they are "common," they are "safe,"

and in their actions they are least apt to step outside the bounds of current public acceptance. Charismatic leaders may be good and desirable insofar as they possess creative vision and a grasp of things to come. However, to the extent that these leaders weaken popular control and deny the essential postulates of democracy, their influence is erosive. Democratic leadership ought to occupy the middle ground somewhere between mediocrity and charisma. To eliminate these two dangers democracies must allow for a constant and regular turnover of strong leaders. It is with this end in view that I turn to the current literature. The five aforementioned "approaches" to democratic leadership were set down mainly as a framework within which recent inquiries might be arranged. All of these methods of analysis contain studies which are relevant to our present purposes. It is hoped that our investigation will yield insights into ways in which we may be able to maximize the advantages of strong charismatic leadership and at the same time to minimize the dangers that are involved. In the following pages, therefore, I will be concerned specifically with the arguments that have been advanced to illustrate the shortcomings of democratic leadership, and suggest ways in which strong and effective leadership may be consistently achieved.

It is often said that widespread political apathy is the harbinger of autocracy. Large-scale apathy is due mainly to a feeling of impotence and helplessness in the face of complex issues. Studies have shown that there is a direct relationship between an

individual's political involvement and his sense of political efficacy.¹ Those with the strongest sense of political efficacy -- that is, those who feel that what they say or do matters a good deal -- are almost always the ones who have the greatest degree of political involvement. The roots of apathy are not unlike Sebastian de Grazia's notion of "anomie" which leads people to turn to some sort of semi-divine hero.² Insofar as apathy stems from a general feeling of misapprehension and incompetence, it may endanger the existence of democracy.³ Charismatic leaders arise out of crisis situations which are characterized by this sort of apathy. The tragedy is that under these circumstances the charismatic may be one who arouses the people merely to derive them of their freedoms.

There are other kinds of apathy -- or perhaps I should say apathy has other bases -- which do not seem to carry these hazardous

¹See Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), pp. 61-62.

²Sebastian de Grazia, The Political Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 175 ff.

³In my view there is a direct relationship between the magnitude of the people's fears and feelings of incompetence and the sort of leadership they have. Good leaders will embody and clarify the tendencies of the people. Strong leaders will seek to focus the aspirations of the people and put them in terms which make complex issues understandable and soluble. Perhaps a good leader is a release valve for the frustration of the masses. A charismatic leaders plays upon that frustration and achieves power at a time when the pressure is highest. In view of this, what is desirable is constant and vigorous leadership which is able to maintain sufficient political involvement without allowing the pressure of mass frustration to reach the explosive point -- the point where the people will turn to a savior.

implications for democracy. For example, Dahl points out that people often do not become involved in politics if they have other things they would rather do.⁴ In normal times there are numerous people who find many activities to be more rewarding than political activities. Moreover, apathy may be the result of confidence and satisfaction. There are people who would become involved except that they believe the outcome will be satisfactory without their involvement.⁵ It may be, as Berelson suggests, that a sizeable group of more or less apathetic citizens is desirable to "cushion" the effect of the intensely motivated and highly active members of the community.⁶ Extreme involvement may seriously impede the flexibility and efficiency of the democratic processes. Nevertheless, there is a danger in apathy which is continuous and is widespread even at election time. Apathy which stems from disillusionment and misunderstanding has a tendency to mushroom until in a crisis situation it calls forth a charismatic leader who may, if he so desires, manipulate the masses in such a way as to be destructive of democracy.

There are two apparent trends in democratic leadership which may be somewhat incidental, but which ought to be clarified before we proceed any further. First, virtually all important leadership

⁴Dahl, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

⁵Ibid., p. 63.

⁶Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Fall, 1952), p. 317.

positions have come to have a measure of charisma attached to them. The charismatic nature of some political offices has reached a degree of permanence which may be explained by the constant air of crisis that pervades the world today, or by "forced apathy" -- that is, by the baffling, alienating nature of current world problems. Thus, every American president is thought to display some degree of super-human qualities.⁷ Gradually President Johnson has acquired some of these awe-inspiring capabilities which were not evident while he remained the vice-president. Secondly, there has been a trend toward increasing emphasis on the executives of democratic governments. This, to my way of thinking, has merely filled a technical need of modern democracies. The increased tempo and the growing complexity of government has demanded that greater latitude be accorded to the experts, the administrators, and ultimately the executive. I would contend, however, that this trend has not done very much to solve the problems of democratic leadership. There is no apparent reason why this tendency should increase the incidence of strong, creative, and event-making leaders.

Giovanni Sartori takes a similar tack to the one I am employing in this thesis. For Sartori, one of the greatest dangers to democracy is a lingering fear and distrust of elites and ruling

⁷John Conway refers to the American Presidency as the most "august position in the world," and he claims that a new attribute of this office is "a certain measure of controlled Caesarism." See John Conway, "Standards of Excellence," in S.R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (eds.), Excellence and Leadership In a Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 73.

aristocracies which tends to blind us to the need for strong leadership.⁸ Sartori tells us we ought to see what kind of leaders we need and chose them according to the features they display. However, the author does not adequately explain how we are to recognize and recruit "the kind of leadership we need." Nevertheless, Sartori is most instructive when he goes on to set down his democratic theory of elites. By defining democracy as an "elective polyarchy" Sartori attempts to account for the vital element of leadership.⁹

The first hurdle which any philosophic account of democratic leadership must cross is Michels' classic "iron law of oligarchy." In essence Michels is questioning the very possibility of democracy. He contends that elites are unavoidable in all social organizations. Political organizations, through the internal necessities of discipline and administrative continuity, inevitably become closed and self-perpetuating oligarchies, counter to the postulates of democracy. Michels' conclusions are based on his observations of democratic political parties and trade unions. He writes: "At the outset, leaders arise SPONTANEOUSLY; their functions are ACCESSORY and GRATUITOUS. Soon, however, they become PROFESSIONAL leaders, and in the second stage of development they are STABLE and IRREMOVABLE."¹⁰ Hence,

⁸Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962), pp. 119 ff.

⁹Ibid., pp. 124 ff.

¹⁰Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959), pp. 400-401.

the elitist view is that "government by the people" is simply unworkable in the face of the historically verifiable iron law of oligarchy. Michels concludes his study with the assertion that "Leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life But . . . every system of leadership is incompatible with the most essential postulates of democracy."¹¹

One cannot deny that Michels has a good point when he asserts that organization inevitably tends toward oligarchy. Michels might have made his argument stronger still by specifically enunciating an "iron law of bureaucracy" which tends to be destructive of what we might call the "spirit" of the democratic way of doing things.¹² However, Sartori denies that Michels' argument is totally valid for democracies. The reason is that Michels uses the wrong method for arriving at conclusions concerning democracy. As I have mentioned, Michels used democratic political parties as his model and with regard to these parties his observations are probably valid.¹³ However,

¹¹Ibid., p. 400.

¹²In fact Michels often seems to confuse notions of organization and bureaucracy, or at least he does not attempt a strict deliniation. However, this does not weaken his argument. See Sartori, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

¹³In this study I have said next-to-nothing about the place of political parties in a democracy. I did not include parties as one of my essential elements of democracy even though all modern democratic systems seem to depend upon them. My reasons for not devoting considerable space to democratic political parties need not be elaborated here. What does bear emphasis here is that parties are quite basic to the democratic system, and most criticisms of Michels that contend that he is simply analyzing something which is totally foreign to democracy miss the mark.

it may be impossible to move from the level of organized political parties to the level of national democracies and claim that these conclusions are valid for the latter. This is the crux of Sartori's criticism of Michels.¹⁴ Political democracy is quite different from voluntary political parties and observations of one cannot be applied to the other with an equal degree of accuracy. Thus, Sartori asserts that elitist critics have never fully understood how democracy is produced. He writes:

Their mistake lies in using a static technique of appraisal, that is, in appraising the degree of democracy within a political system by a correspondence test with a model that has no alter ego, instead of looking at democracy as a chain-reaction to be judged dynamically. They seek democracy in structures and not in interactions. They want to find it immobilized in, within something, instead of seeking it between, as a dynamic relationship among groups and organizations. To put it briefly, their mistake consists in looking for life in a body that is already dead, in searching for democracy where it no longer exists. This does not mean that structures are not important and affect our argument insofar as their effects are concerned.¹⁵

Thus, for Sartori, the solution is not to look within organizations, but rather to look at relations between separate and competing organizations. This places the large unorganized majority in the position of an arbitrator or judge in a dispute between two or more organized and politically active minorities. Hence, regardless of the organizational features of political parties, the result of competition between them is democracy.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 122 ff.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 123.

It is a relatively easy step to move from the above discussion to Sartori's notion of an "elective polyarchy." Relying heavily on Schumpeter's idea of competitive leadership, Sartori asserts that "democracy should be a polyarchy of elected elites," or stated differently, "democracy ought to be a selective system of competing elected minorities."¹⁶ By this method Sartori believes he has "balanced" the theory of democracy. Without rejecting the classical emphasis on the demos, he has openly admitted the importance of the leadership principle. A theory of elites may be democratic, aristocratic, or something else, depending upon the purposes to which it is put. Sartori concludes:

I therefore venture to suggest that the democratic theory of elites is in the light of present-day factual knowledge -- the core of democratic theory itself. To know the facts and refuse to acknowledge them by putting two and two together -- as many people are still doing -- is an unhealthy and in the long run, suicidal policy.¹⁷

John Conway argues that the answer to the problem of political leadership in the United States "is simply that we must learn to accept the idea of leadership itself, as we never have before excepting in a time of crisis, as a permanent part of our political philosophy."¹⁸ Conway calls for "creative vision" of a sort which

¹⁶Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 128.

¹⁸Conway, loc. cit.

rarely arise in a democracy -- except perhaps in crisis situations when predominantly charismatic leaders assume power.

This means a serious modification in our habits of political thought, and, in particular, in that habit of thought that considers the politician primarily as the representative and spokesmen for the wishes of the electorate.

. . . if we do not realize that creative action is necessary and that creative action is indissolubly allied with this concept of and acceptance of leadership, the power to mold the future will pass from our hands into those of men and nations who have solved the problem of leadership once and for all by the simple and brutal device of destroying freedom.¹⁹

Conway's view of the shortcomings of leadership are not unlike those of Walter Lippmann. For Lippmann, democratic governments have become paralyzed because the people have acquired power which they cannot exercise. Lippmann's argument and the implications arising out of it are worth pursuing at some length, for it seems to me that he is expressing a criticism which is widely adhered to in modern democracies. The masses cannot govern themselves so (in theory, at least) they elect leaders to do it for them. The problem, as Lippmann sees it, is that these men have abdicated their responsibility. The tragedy is that within democracies there are always men who know, who are worth listening to, and who could warn the people about their mistakes. But the climate of democracy does not inspire these people to speak out. "For what Churchill did in the thirties before Munich was exceptional: the general rule is that a

¹⁹Ibid., p. 74.

democratic politician had better not be right too soon."²⁰ It can be devastating for a politician to keep up with the movement of events as they really happen rather than taking the safe route well within the bounds of public opinion. Democratic leaders are always primarily concerned with staying in office. They "rarely feel they can afford the luxury of telling the whole truth to the people."²¹ Equally, these men find it more comfortable not to hear the complete truth so often. "The men under them who report and collect the news come to realize in their own turn that it is safer to be wrong before it has become fashionable to be right."²²

With few exceptions democratic politicians are "insecure and intimidated men." Acts are not measured by their goodness, but by their popularity, and these are not necessarily one in the same. "Politicians," wrote Lippmann, "rationalize this servitude by saying that in a democracy public men are servants of the people."²³ This devitalization of governing power is the malady of democratic states. "As the malady grows, the executive becomes highly susceptible to encroachment and usurpation by elected assemblies; they are pressed and harrassed by the higgling of parties, by the agents of organized

²⁰Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p. 28.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., p. 29.

interest and by the spokesmen of sectarians and ideologues."²⁴
This infirmity can be fatal when important decisions such as war and peace must be made, but the executive department with its civil servants and technicians has lost its power to act. The problem is that there is some sort of functional derangement between the executive power on the one hand, and the elected assemblies and the mass electorate on the other hand. Modern leaders must be elected, but in Lippmann's words, "they have no status and no tenure which reinforces their consciences, which invests them with power to withstand the tides of popular opinion and to defend the public interest."²⁵
These executives are elected for short periods of time and they must constantly manipulate and maneuver various factions and pressure groups to stay in power. "In the daily routine of democratic politics, elected executives can never for long take their eyes from the mirror of the constituencies. They must not look too much out of the window at the realities beyond."²⁶

Thus, Lippmann stands squarely as one who believes the democracies have fallen into weakness and chaos since their leaders have had to listen and respond to their mass publics. In this regard Lippmann's observations are not wholly different from those of

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 44.

²⁶ Ibid.

Ortega y Gasset in The Revolt of the Masses, written some twenty-five years earlier. V.O. Key states this view most succinctly:

When all its elements are pieced together, the analysis produces a picture of government incapable of decisive and timely action in foreign politics for lack of assured capacity to command popular support; of a government hamstrung in domestic affairs by its forced preoccupation with the distribution of loaves and fishes; of a government so responsive to even synthetic popular clamor that it must infringe the liberties of its citizens and commit wrongs that outrage the sense of decency of honorable men.²⁷

From this it may be clear that Key does not accept the view that democracy is seriously impeded by a dictatorship of public opinion.

It is pointed out by Berelson²⁸ and reiterated by Key²⁹ that a considerable proportion of the electorate remains uninterested in and uninformed about most of the tangible policies of government. It may be asserted with some degree of certainty that most of the people do not have considered opinions concerning government policies, and most of the remainder express opinions that are anything but clear or concise. The fact is that there is no homogeneous and menacing mass opinion which threatens a government's life as soon as it steps out of line -- except perhaps in extreme cases where government action is limited by near-universal agreement on what should

²⁷ V.O. Key, "Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy," The Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXVII (Autumn, 1961), p. 484.

²⁸ Berelson, op. cit., pp. 316-317.

²⁹ Key, loc. cit., p. 485.

or should not be done. Key argues that "within whatever limits opinion fixes, government enjoys wide discretion in the determination of whether to act, in the timing of the action, and in the choice of the measures it takes."³⁰ Even in times of election, the public very rarely, if ever, shows a clear preference for one policy over the other. In addition to this, Key questions the actual power of the leaders of pressure groups. He suggests that governments often over-estimate the degree of interest and understanding which is possessed by the members of pressure groups. Consequently, governments often may wrongly assume that the leaders of pressure groups have the overwhelming support of the members and that they may, if they wish, convert this support into votes in the next election.³¹

³⁰ Ibid., p. 486.

³¹ This is an area in which I feel there is extensive distortion and a good deal of work ought to be done. Very often governments seem to attach too much significance to what the community and organization leaders have to say. For example, I would suggest that the president of the Farmers' Union of Alberta attracts a good deal more attention among provincial government officials than his actual support from the farmers warrants. I would suggest that the primary benefit accruing from the governments consulting, say, Ed Nelson, the former president of the F.U.A., is that they have the opinion of a successful and intelligent farmer. No doubt governments derive considerable propaganda value from their consultations with group leaders. However, in most cases governments seem to assume that these leaders, if they are not complied with or at least pacified, could do them extensive damage at the polls. To me this assumption seems unwarranted -- we simply do not know. Research shows that members are often unaware of the aims, policies, and functions of their own groups. This sort of research ought to be combined with investigations into the perceptions of government leaders concerning the significance of pressure groups and pressure group leaders. My guess is that the results would indicate a wide discrepancy.

In spite of what may seem to be a wide divergence, Lippmann and Key do not disagree on the fundamental of the problem. In over-simplified terms, Lippmann is saying that democratic leadership is too much the pawn of public opinion and the thing to do is to shock the leaders into realizing their responsibilities. Key, once again in over-simplified terms, is saying that if mass opinion is hindering strong leadership, it is as much a fault of naive leaders as it is a fault of a multiform mass opinion. Key might concede that leaders are dominated by "public opinion," but this is only because the leaders believe that the people hold certain opinions and that these opinions are very significant. Both scholars are looking to the leaders for the answers. One of Key's foremost objectives is to show that "those who blame mass opinion for our ills hang the wrong villain."³²

In Lippmann's view, the problem of executive leadership did not become urgently exposed until the twentieth century. Since the turn of the century there has been ample evidence of what feeble leadership can do -- the war of 1914, the unstable peace in 1919, and the Second World War are examples. Lippmann contends that the normal constitutional procedures for protecting the executive need to be augmented by a principle which, when applied deeply enough, gets at the root of the disorder of modern democracy. This principle runs as follows:

³² Ibid., p. 489.

. . . though public officials are elected by the voters, or are appointed by men who are elected, they owe their primary allegiance not to the opinions of the voters but to the law, to the criteria of their professions, to the integrity of the arts and sciences in which they work, to their own conscientious and responsible convictions of their duty within the rules and the frame of reference they have sworn to respect.³³

These are very high-flown ideals, and there is no doubt in my mind that if every democratic leader adopted Lippmann's formula as his first principle of life, we would be much the better for it. However, I am confident that democratic leaders are not going to adopt this attitude regardless of who tells them to do so. Lippmann simply does not tell us how we are going to make the leaders understand their "primary allegiance," or how we are to recruit leaders who already have this understanding. In the regard, Key's observations are immensely more practical and suggestive of concrete action which may be taken.

Key suggests that we take a hard look at the attitudes, habits, and beliefs of the political activists in our society. Without rejecting the outlook of the masses as irrelevant, Key takes what he considers to be a wholly realistic view of democracy as embodying a "political aristocracy," similar to Sartori's notion of

³³ Lippmann, op. cit., p. 46. A remarkably similar requirement is expressed by Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 136.

elites in a democracy.³⁴ This is an aristocracy consisting of political influentials and activists with no appreciable distinction in terms of social and economic privileges. "Perhaps the policies of a democratic order depend ultimately on the outlooks and concerns of the more activated citizenry rather than on mass opinion."³⁵ What is needed, therefore, is careful inquiry into the attitudes and beliefs of political influentials. Moreover, these inquiries should be carried out over time to account for changes which have occurred or may occur. This may lead to interesting correlations between democratic policy and the changing beliefs of the opinion-makers. Key concludes his study with the following apt expression of his conviction:

If the American democracy has within itself a drive toward self-destruction, we might more accurately localize the trouble by looking among the best people than at the great mass of people. I doubt that political systems, be they democratic or otherwise, are often destroyed by the self-corruption of the masses.³⁶

John W. Gardiner spends several pages convincing his readers

³⁴ A recent and very worthwhile study which utilized opinion leaders as its focal point was James N. Rosenau's study of consensus-building in American foreign policy. For Rosenau's reasons for studying the "opinion-makers" instead of the mass public, see James N. Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 46.

³⁵ Key, op. cit., p. 491.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 494.

that what democracy needs is a natural and responsible "aristocracy of talent," and then he goes on to claim that the word "aristocracy" simply cannot be applied to any situation where leadership is as dispersed as it is in modern democracies.³⁷ In spite of this, Gardiner makes at least one observation which is plausible and worthy of research. He claims that influentials or opinion-makers in the United States "lack a sense of their role as leaders, a sense of the obligations which they have incurred as a result of the eminence which they have achieved."³⁸ Those who may be labelled as leaders in the United States probably number in the tens or hundreds of thousands. In addition to these, there are at least two million who we may not wish to call leaders but who are definitely political activists or influentials. Gardiner's point is that these people play a real and significant role in national political life. However, most of these leaders tend to deny that they are really leaders. It seems to be a sort of "false modesty." They realize that they are leaders or influentials but they apparently do not want other people to know that they realize it.³⁹ The net result is that these men tend to shrink from the sort of responsibility that those in posi-

³⁷ John W. Gardiner, Excellence (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1961), pp. 118 ff.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 125.

³⁹ At this point I have gone quite a bit beyond what Gardiner actually holds. However, his argument seems to point in the direction I have taken. Ibid.

tions of leadership should accept.

The important fact here is that this is another area in which research may be of great value. It should be fairly easy to fashion an investigation which would contrast the actual power and influence which a leader wields with the influence he perceives himself as holding. At present this is little more than speculation. No one, to my knowledge, has attempted to measure the extent to which leaders in a democracy ignore their responsibilities because they apparently do not want to admit the fact that they have considerable influence. Hence, Gardiner, perhaps for lack of anything more concrete to say, suggests that democratic leaders should start leading; they should develop a sense of responsibility and the "moral depth" to measure up to the task which faces them. This sort of recommendation is not unlike Lippmann's, and in a way which I have already intimated, it is unsatisfactory.

It is desirable that some of our most creative minds aspire to power in a democratic society. Moreover, it is desirable, as Gardiner suggests, that these leaders possess a sense of responsibility which is commensurate with their leadership position. A lack of toleration or pressure toward conformity may prevent creative leaders from arising. Abse and Jessner submit that toleration of opinions which are at variance to those of the leader is essential in a democracy. "However," they caution, "this toleration necessitates a constant vigilance, because cravings for a magical fulfillment of primitive longings are ever present and sometimes take a form inimi-

cal to democracy and our ideals of freedom."⁴⁰ These authors further suggest that mass fantasies, which apparently derive from early childhood experiences and relationships, may be destructive of the most basic of democratic values. What is required to combat this trend is that democratic values be made explicit, and that steps be taken to build up an "inner discipline" sufficient to safeguard these values.⁴¹ David McClelland suggests that there is a modern tendency to lay too much emphasis on the purely academic side of life. "Other types of human excellence exist, particularly those involving character and the inner life, and the world of imagination and human sensitivity."⁴² Excellence in democratic leadership may be greatly facilitated by seeking out the ways and means for stressing these other human qualities.

I believe that there is great worth in the efforts of some to explicate our democratic values in a way which is honest, con-

⁴⁰ W. Abse and L. Jessner, "The Psychodynamic Aspects of Leadership," in S.R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (eds.), Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 90.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² David C. McClelland, "Encouraging Excellence," in S.R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (eds.), Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 201. For some idea of the extent to which leaders possess other qualities and the ways in which these features may be recognized and measured see C.A. Gibb, "Leadership," in G. Lindzey, (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. II (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 886 ff.

cise and understandable. Much of the onus for maintaining a healthy democracy must fall on the educators within our society. Educators must be dedicated to a constant search for truth. Moreover, they must be dedicated in such a way that they only relate the truth, as they know it, to their students. Democracy rests upon the assumption that the people will usually make the right decision if they are given the truth. There is no legal or constitutional method by which democrats can ensure that their leaders will tell them the truth. Truthfulness, insofar as it is realizable, must be a chain reaction which begins with those who search out the facts and is carried on by those who convey the facts. In support of this, Robert Morison writes:

. . . as more and more features of our life fall under the control of those who wield a specialized body of knowledge over it, we must seek some protection against misuse. This, it seems to me, can be found only in the individual moral and intellectual excellence of those who develop, hold, and disseminate knowledge.⁴³

Norman L. Stamps argues that good democratic government does not necessarily follow from advancement in education. Stamps contends that the modern trend toward high specialization and the tendency to rely on "experts," both in specialized fields and in the field of politics have increased the incidence and the possibil-

⁴³ Robert S. Morison, "New Types of Excellence," in S.R. Graubard and Gerald Holton (eds.), Excellence and Leadership in a Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 201.

ities of charisma.⁴⁴ He points to Germany as one of the most literate and educated nations in the world prior to the rise of Hitler. As Lord Bryce pointed out as early as 1924,

Attainments in learning and science do little to make men wise in politics. Some eminent scientific men have been in this respect no wiser than their undergraduate pupils. There have been countries in which the chiefs of public services and the professors in universities were prominent in the advocacy of policies which proved disastrous.⁴⁵

Of course, Stamps admits that knowledge is better than ignorance. Moreover, he would probably acknowledge the fact that there are certain young "democracies" that are floundering today partly because of a general lack of formal education. Stamps' concluding remarks are worth quoting:

. . . knowledge is only one among the many things which go into the making of a good citizen, and increased educational opportunity has not always produced an increase in political education. Insofar as the growth of large cities has reduced the opportunity for personal participation by the citizen in local self-government, an important training ground of democracy has been lost; and insofar as modern education has failed to produce a well-rounded individual capable of critically analyzing political issues and devoted to participation in community life and taking an active interest in civic affairs, it has failed to produce the type of man upon which democracy depends.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Norman L. Stamps, Why Democracies Fail (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957), p. 115.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 116.

Near the end of this quotation, Stamps strikes at the heart of what I consider to be one of the most promising areas within which we may strive to achieve strong democratic leadership. That is an emphasis on the quality of education; an education which enables people to make sound political judgments; an education which instills men of ability with the kind of knowledge, inspiration, values, and quality of character that strong democratic leaders must have. Education of this type must be firmly grounded in reality. To this end we must turn to modern research which, when properly combined with normative theory, will provide the educators with the political truths necessary for the building of well-rounded citizens.

Modern research ought to have as its over-all objective the determination of the extent to which the theoretical assumptions of democracy conform to the practices of democracy. Only in this way can we hope to gain ground in the struggle to bring democratic practices more into harmony with the ideals of democracy. Moreover, as many writers suggest, the inverse may be true; in this way we may arrive at a position where we will be encouraged to modify seriously our notions of what is desirable. Democracy may indicate a functional need which simply cannot be encompassed within Prevailing theoretical tenets.

We ought to have research into what people believe. It would be more instructive, particularly regarding the leadership phenomenon, if we had precise knowledge of how ordinary citizens view the

desirable and actual processes of democracy.⁴⁷ This, of course, could be carried further to an analysis of the factors that are responsible for these views. As I have intimated elsewhere in this thesis, it is possible that there is a good deal of divergence between people's views of liberty and equality and the kinds of liberty and equality that they actually possess. Furthermore, once again stating a view that I have proposed elsewhere, this sort of variation may drastically influence the kinds of leaders that an individual will support or even accept.

We ought to have research into what the leaders believe. Leaders must take the initiative, create the frames of reference, and determine the issues of public discussion. We need to know the extent to which leaders see these functions as part of their responsibility and the degree to which they see themselves as actually fulfilling these requirements. The tendency to focus on leaders, opinion-makers, influentials, or political activists seems to be a relatively recent endeavor. We need more research into the real sources of power in a democratic society. We need to find out in what policy areas the leader can demonstrate considerable amounts on initiative and strength, and in what areas he must tread lightly.

⁴⁷ One attempt to do something like this is J.N. Perryman, "On The Meaning of Democracy," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (Spring, 1953), pp. 47-60. This effort to determine the views of laymen does not rate elaboration here. Perryman does not arrive at any conclusions that are very valuable or concrete. Moreover, throughout his analysis he employs the highly dubious method of asking respondents to name their favorite politicians and then ascribing democratic beliefs to each respondent in accordance with the expressed beliefs of the politician he chose.

We need to investigate the formation of elite opinion as it is affected by environmental changes and other societal factors.

Finally, there are other less integrated areas where research can contribute immeasurably to an increase in the effectiveness of democratic leadership. For example, Sanford's study of public orientation to Roosevelt leads him to conclude, among other things, that "the more economically secure may be more inclined to identify with F.D.R. as a person, while the less secure look up to him as a savior."⁴⁸ This leads Sanford to assert that the ill-housed and ill-fed "cannot psychologically afford what we might regard as a mature, democratic orientation to leaders."⁴⁹ And, he concludes, as long as we have significant numbers of deprived people we will have "dictator-fodder," for it is this group that is most inclined toward unquestioning acceptance of the charismatic appeals of benign-appearing leaders.

Another area which may hold considerable promise for the study of leadership is that of personality structure analysis. It seems clear that individuals with certain personality characteristics are more disposed toward accepting charismatic leaders than are others. Although he did not use strict personality analysis,

⁴⁸ F.H. Sanford, "Public Orientation to Roosevelt," Public Opinion Quarterly, XV (Summer, 1951), p. 200.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 203.

James C. Davies, in his study of the 1952 American presidential campaign, distinguished a group of individuals that he labelled as "charismatic followers."⁵⁰ There would seem to be some value in setting down personality factors which influence leadership choices. The real value here may come from comparisons between nations, between regions, and over time.⁵¹

Jacques Maritain attempts to describe the intangible dynamic force which gives political movements their energy, their drive, and their sense of purpose and direction. This he refers to as the "prophetic factor." It is an element which democracies cannot do without. "The people need prophets. . . . They are needed in the normal functioning of a democratic society. They are needed especially in the periods of crisis, birth, or basic renewal of a democratic society."⁵² It stands to reason that the best situation is one in which those who hold and exercise power in the state are also the genuine prophets of the people. In Maritain's view democratic leadership "should normally be exercised by small dynamic groups

⁵⁰ James C. Davies, "Charisma in the 1952 Campaign," The American Political Science Review, XLVIII (December, 1954), pp. 1083-1084.

⁵¹ Incidentally, out of the 1799 voters that he studied, Davies found that only 32 were predominantly affected by charisma. From this he concludes that charisma was not a major factor in the 1952 election. However, I would hesitate to infer from this study that charisma is generally not significant.

⁵² Maritain, op. cit., p. 139.

freely organized and multiple in nature, which would not be concerned with electoral success but with devoting themselves entirely to a great social and political idea, and which would act as a ferment either inside or outside the political parties."⁵³ However, "where there is inspiration and prophecy, there are false prophets and true prophets; thieves aiming to dominate men and servants aiming to set them free; inspiration from dark instincts and inspiration from genuine love."⁵⁴ This seems to suggest that the foremost problem for democracy is to distinguish between genuine prophets and those who feign prophecy merely as a means to greater power.

Thus, there must be an eternal vigilance against the misuse of power by the prophetic minorities. Maritain asserts that although the people occasionally must be awakened, they never want to be awakened. Prophetic minorities claim to speak for the whole people when in fact they are only speaking for themselves. "The question is: are the people to be awakened or to be used? to be awakened like men or to be whipped and driven like cattle?"⁵⁵ The crucial role of "shock-minorities" in the development of democratic societies, and the obvious dangers involved, leads Maritain to make several

⁵³ Ibid., p. 140.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 141.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 142.

recommendations which I will paraphrase here.⁵⁶ First, the activities of prophetic minorities must always remain within the law in a democracy. It is only justifiable to break the law when the minority is confronted with some other tyrannical power which has already broken the law. Second, the use of force is just as exceptional as breaking the law. Justice must always prevail. There is no justification for terrorizing, punishing, or killing innocent people. Third, the rightness or wrongness of shock-minorities can only be determined in retrospect, after the fact. Therefore it is imperative that minorities do not postpone, coerce, or deny the free approval of the people. In addition, once the people have been allowed this right, the minority must relinquish power if the people say so.

Finally, the greatest insurance against false servants of the people comes from "the strength of the common ethos, the inner energy of democratic faith and civil morality in the people themselves, the enjoyment by them of a real freedom in their every-day life and of a truly human standard of living, and the active participation of them in political life from the bottom up."⁵⁷ The people should do everything to preserve their freedom of expression and criticism -- the bulwark of their political liberties. But most of all, for Maritain, as for Stamps, the preserving and strengthening of a democracy should begin at the grass-roots level. Maritain en-

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 144-146.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 146.

visages a society where the prophetic or inspirational factor is a normal and well integrated function. It would arise naturally out of the interactions of free men. This process must begin at the local level where the people can choose their leaders according to their known qualities and trustworthiness. Out of this there should arise a definite political awareness and a consciousness of political realities on the part of men who are genuine deputies of the people.

Modern democracies have not consistently produced strong heroic leaders. Traditional democratic thought often takes a form which is inimical to the ascendance of vigorous leaders. It may be part of the democratic character to be suspicious of gifted men with ideas; to distrust, or at least ignore, the "outsider" who gets things done and who could do things for democracy that it cannot do for itself; to fear the corrupting influence of power and anyone who aspires to power. Unless democracies are able to openly accept energetic and aggressive leadership on a regular basis they face the possibility of an endless vacillation between mediocrity and charisma. Mediocrity is preserved by the fear of leadership and by the friendly, freedom-giving appeal of the "right man" -- the man who can win. Charisma remains an emergency function, often successfully utilized by gifted men to meet crisis situations, and often it comes into play as a direct result of the failures of weak government. We must modify our political thought to include heroic leadership, while at the same time we preserve and strengthen the safeguards of democracy. By maintaining the institutional arrange-

ments that were implemented to protect the liberties of all citizens, and by striving to strengthen the faith and conviction of the mass of the people concerning the realities of government and the democratic principles which are geared to preserve their freedom, we may be able to strengthen leadership without giving vent to power-hungry zealots whose primary goal is to impose their will on the world.

As democracy itself develops a realistic conception of the indispensable place of leadership in the democratic process -- the indispensable role of leadership as a witness to man's freedom -- it will be in a better position to judge the pretensions of heroic leaders, and it will probably experience far less need for them.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Arthur Schlesinger Jr., "On Heroic Leadership," Encounter XV (December, 1960), p. 11.

APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON IRRATIONALITY

I feel somewhat obliged to say something in defense of the use of "irrational," since the term seems to be a good deal less in vogue in modern political writing than at any time in the past. The tendency to avoid "irrational" as a descriptive or explanatory term is an apparent result of the problem of defining it. Another difficulty, which may merely be a restatement of the problem of definition, is that what appears to be an irrational belief when viewed by an outside observer is seen as quite rational from the point of view of the experiencing person. That is, what is irrational for one person may not be for another. It may be that something like "illogical" would be a "better" or "safer" word to employ in this thesis. However, Max Weber makes extensive use of notions of rationality and irrationality, and for this reason, if no other, I will attempt to clarify the terms.

In common usage rationality is often employed as the exact opposite of emotionality. In fact, this is repeatedly the case with Weber. For Weber, rationalism is diametrically opposed to all forms of emotionalism, magic, prophecy and mysticism. It is clear that many of the terms which are used to define charisma are also used to describe irrationality. Charisma is intrinsically irrational. Charismatic authority is irrational because it depends upon "concrete revelations and inspirations."¹ The process of "rationaliza-

¹ From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) p. 296.

tion," therefore, involves the displacement of magical and mystical elements of thought with those that are logically coherent, consistent, and systematic. However, Weber does not use the notion of irrationality solely in its affective sense. He recognizes other factors and other ways of employing rationality.²

For me there are essentially three criteria which define a rational act: (1) it must be telic -- that is, goal-directed or purposeful; (2) the goal must be possible -- that is, the results must be testable in experience; and (3) the means for achieving the goal must be appropriate.³ Thus, an irrational act is one which is somehow deflected from one or more of the above criteria. Weber seems to recognize these criteria in one form or other.⁴ For Weber there are "rationally expedient," "affective," and "traditionalist" "types of action." Weber was primarily concerned with "understandable" action -- that is rationally expedient action -- of which the conduct of "economic man" is a leading example. Both affectual and traditional actions are irrational, the former flowing purely from sentiment, and the latter approximating the level of blind instinct. The pursuit of "absolute ends" is irrational insofar as it flows from affectual and traditional conduct. However, the means

² For example, see Ibid., pp. 293-94.

³ These three criteria were suggested to me by Dr. G. Nettler of the Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, who claims to have followed Pareto in this regard.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 293 ff.

for obtaining these ends may be rational. Consequently, Weber appears to classify irrational acts as those which derive primarily from instinct, emotion, drive, or some form of blind will. In his book Consciousness and Society, H. Stuart Hughes asserts that Weber's greatest intellectual weakness was his "isolation of rationality," his single-minded concern with what was "rationally understandable," and his failure to deal effectively with affective and rational cognitive elements in the same action.⁵

It is hoped that this annotation will help to illuminate Weber's use of irrational. In this study irrational is used in a sense which is predominantly indicative of affective behavior. However, we should try to be more precise than this. Thus, throughout the thesis an attempt is made to use notions of rationality and irrationality in such a way that they can be shown to be in accordance with the three criteria which are set down above. It bears emphasizing that I do not claim to have relieved all of the controversy surrounding ideas of rationality. On the contrary, the concept still may be seen as highly ambiguous. There is still ample room for arguments among individuals concerning means-ends relationships; but these disagreements must stem from different opinions or beliefs, or differing perceptions and experiences.

⁵ H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 330.

APPENDIX B

EVIDENCE OF CHARISMA

My intention here is to give some concrete evidence of charisma in Hitler, Roosevelt, Churchill and Diefenbaker. The only truly authentic evidence can come from the spoken or written words of the leader himself or from the followers who bear witness to the charismatic appeal. Therefore, I must reiterate that much of the "evidence" which is used in this study is secondhand insofar as it involves the opinions of observers concerning the motives, feelings and perceptions of both the leaders and the followers.

Adolf Hitler

Hitler managed to convince the people that he possessed miraculous gifts which would enable him to save and restore the German nation. In The Political Community Sebastian de Grazia offers salient evidence of the conditions in which Hitler arose and the bond which he held with the German people.¹ Much of what de Grazia says deserves quoting. He reports the words of a German teacher:

Around 1923 I reached the conclusion that no party, but a single man alone could save Germany. This opinion was shared by others, for when the cornerstone of a monument was laid in my home town, the following lines were inscribed on it: 'Descendants who read these words, know

¹ Sebastian de Grazia, The Political Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948).

ye that we eagerly await the coming of the man whose strong hand may restore order.'²

And a businessman:

These were sad years. . . . As a cattle dealer, I had ample opportunity to observe the reactions of people. . . . The call for a second Bismarck resounded throughout East Prussia. The desire for a leader was evident in every political manifestation of East Prussians. . . . They could not understand why a great leader had not arisen to scatter Marxism to the four winds and give Germany a new lease on life.³

And, most significantly, here are the testimonials of several party members:

I heard Hitler in Bonn in 1926. . . . From that day on I could never violate my allegiance to Hitler. I saw his illimitable faith in his people and the desire to set them free. His conviction upheld us whenever we weakened amidst our trials; we leaned upon him in our weariness.

His never-to-be forgotten speech affected me as the words of a prophet.

I first saw Hitler at an S.A. Meeting at Gera in September, 1931. The experience was a revelation to us, and we should have rushed blindly anywhere Hitler commanded us to go. The sun shone all the time Hitler was there, in proverbial 'Hitler weather.' Before his arrival and after he left, it rained so hard we were drenched.

We, oldtime National Socialists, did not join the S.A. for reasons of self-interest. Our feelings led us to Hitler. There was a tremendous surge in our hearts, a something that said: 'Hitler you are our man.'⁴

Further evidence of the factors underlying Hitler's magnetic appeal is seen in the words of Peter Drucker:

² Ibid., p. 176.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 176-77.

It was not Hitler who made himself a demi-god; it was the masses who pushed him on this pedestal. For only a demon, a superman and magician who can never err and who is always right can resolve the contradiction between the need for a miracle and the impossibility of producing one. Only unquestioning belief in the Fuhrer can give the security of conviction which the masses crave in order to be spared from despair. . . . Hitler must be right because otherwise nothing is.⁵

Probably the most succinct espousal of Hitler's charismatic appeal was put forth by one of his most famous followers, Herman Goering, when he said: "We believe deeply and unswervingly that God has sent Adolf Hitler to us to save Germany."⁶

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Roosevelt was a great leader insofar as he was able to solve the crisis and advance the prospect of a brighter future, in an atmosphere of freedom, while preserving constitutionalism and the democratic way of life. Much of Roosevelt's strength derived from the charismatic bond which existed between the President and his followers. J.M. Burns writes:⁷

⁵ Quoted in Ibid., p. 177.

⁶ Quoted in Ibid., p. 178. Also, for an excellent discussion of Hitler's charismatic leadership and the Nazi Party see Hans H. Gerth, "The Nazi Party: Its Leadership and Composition," in R.K. Merton et al, (eds.), Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 100-113.

⁷ J.M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and The Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), p. 203.

Some leaders have the power to inspire intense love and devotion in the circle of freinds and subordinates immediately around them, while appearing frigid and aloof to millions out beyond. Other leaders possess just the reverse qualities. To a remarkable degree Roosevelt appealed both to his immediate circle and to the great public as well. 'I have been as close to Franklin Roosevelt as a valet,' said Louis Howe, no sentimentalist, as he lay slowly dying in a Washington hospital, 'and he is still a hero to me.' Even crusty, churlish Harold Ickes melted under the Roosevelt charm. . . . Watching the patients at Warm Springs swarming around Roosevelt's car, singing to him, laughing with him, treating him like a big jolly brother, Ickes said, 'I have never had contact with a man who is loved as he is.'⁸

Burns relates that in 1938 Roosevelt's public support reached one of the lowest points of his entire career. Yet his "personal" popularity was as high as ever.⁹ Public disenchantment with the President was apparently a result of his policies and methods rather than personality factors. throughout this period Roosevelt seemed to maintain his charismatic affect, although his popularity waned because of other perceived shortcomings. 'His great strength lay in his own political personality, in the magic spell that he could still cast over the voters. His weakness lay in the anxiety of millions over his seemingly great political power -- an anxiety like that of a wife who adores a gay and vibrant husband without wholly trusting his judgement or his self-control.'¹⁰

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 337 ff.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 339.

The New Deal itself was a visionary project of the future.

E.E. Robinson in The Roosevelt Leadership 1933 - 1945 writes:

The President appeared to his fellow citizens in the years 1933 - 1935 as their symbol for recovery and promise for the future. His pace of action and utterance was vigorous. Everywhere he went and before many audiences, he appeared no longer as the advocate of a particular program. He appeared as a new kind of President, and he was given wide acclaim

.
He envisaged himself as the representative of the people. He was leading them in a crusade. Constantly he saw, and said he saw, the forces of evil taking rights and powers and opportunities away from the people.¹¹

Roosevelt constantly paraded himself as a champion and savior of the masses. Norman L. Stamps refers to an American business man who said that President Franklin D. Roosevelt was "the greatest leader since Jesus Christ."¹² His appeal was successful insofar as he was able to gain widespread support from virtually all segments of American society. Robinson is also instructive in this regard:

Mr. Roosevelt as a candidate was in a position to emphasize his role as an evangelist. He spoke with authority and what was believed to be deep understanding of the problems of government. He specialized in expression of hope for the future. He did not need to discuss doctrine nor did he need to emphasize unity of forces. As an experienced leader of the people, he could rightly take the highroad of the crusade for righteousness. He need not counsel caution, and he need not appear humble.¹³

¹¹ E.E. Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership 1933 - 1945 (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1955), p. 178.

¹² N.L. Stamps, Why Democracies Fail (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957), p. 112.

¹³ Robinson, op. cit., p. 180.

As an outstanding example of this "crusading," "righteous" appeal, which we have chosen to call charismatic, Robinson points to Roosevelt's "acceptance" speech at Franklin Field, Philadelphia, on June 27, 1936. This oration contains a denunciation of "economic royalists" and envisages a "rendezvous with destiny."¹⁴

Sir Winston Churchill

Satisfactory evidence of Churchill's charismatic appeal is not abundant. However, there is no doubt that Churchill masterfully appealed to both the eye and the ear of his followers. He looked and behaved like someone important. He was in the forefront in manner, in dress, and above all, in speech. Unending tributes have been paid to Churchill's superlative rhetoric and command of the English language.

When the services which Winston Churchill has rendered to the nation come to be evaluated, highest place will be found for the incomparable speeches in which he declared Britain's inflexible purpose, gave cause for confidence in the outcome of the struggle, strengthened the waverers, and imparted new inspiration to the staunch of heart.¹⁵

"He was," writes Broad, "the very embodiment of the national spirit."¹⁶ Within a week of assuming office Churchill presented himself to the House of Commons and delivered his historic call to service, offering in return nothing but "blood,

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 180 n.

¹⁵ Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1941), p. 301.

¹⁶ Ibid.

toil, tears and sweat." Broad gives the following vivid testimonial of the crisis situation which allowed Churchill to aspire to the office of Prime Minister:

Never had a man taken office in such circumstances. Never had England's peril been so great. Never had the next unpredictable hour been so fraught with the illimitable possibilities of ill. On Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the blows of the blitzkrieg descended. After eight months of suspense, war in its grimmest and most menacing shape burst upon Flanders -- and Flanders is but a short flight from London.¹⁷

For further evidence of the extraordinary speeches and the charismatic union which they engendered we turn once again to Lewis Broad's biography of Churchill.

His language is rich, colourful, infinitely varied. Few speakers have had such a command of words, can pour out words in such flow of rhetoric. The thought is elevated, the meaning abundantly clear. No man can excel him in extracting the last essence of drama from a situation. Few can equal him in his irony. His phrases will live for all time -- 'their finest hour,' 'never was so much owed by so many to so few,' 'give us the tools and we will finish the job' -- there is scarcely a speech in the series that lacks its epigram.

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No speaker has ever obtained so great a hold on so vast an audience as the Prime Minister during the long conflict. His addresses were as much a contribution to the war effort as the arms and munitions for the fighting forces. These it was that kept the nation in good heart throughout the anxious days of the autumn and winter of 1940.¹⁸

Broad's words in themselves are a tribute to Churchill's leadership which was something more than merely courageous, or

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 276-77.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 301-302.

merely successful, or both. He filled a need as only one with great charismatic appeal could have done.

John Diefenbaker

The following excerpts from Peter C. Newman's Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years¹⁹ will strike a familiar note for anyone who attended to Canadian politics during the 1958 federal election campaign. It was during this campaign that Diefenbaker fully revealed his charismatic character, and illustrated the near magic it could invoke among the electorate.

Diefenbaker set the tone for his appeal at his initial election rally in Winnipeg, on February 12, 1958. Newman writes:

After vaguely outlining his intentions to improve the communications, transportation, and hydro facilities of the Canadian north, Diefenbaker abandoned his text and burst out with the rallying cry that he would carry across the nation: 'This is the Vision,' he proclaimed. 'Canadians, realize your opportunities! This is the message I give you, my fellow Canadians. Not one of defeatism. Jobs! Jobs for hundreds of thousands of Canadians. A new Vision! A new hope! A new soul for Canada.' . . .²⁰

. . . the cabinet of which I have the honor to be Prime Minister will not fail those who are unemployed. That's my message to all. Completion of Confederation by developing a self-governing North. It will mean capital investment by Canadians and by foreign investors of many millions of dollars. It will assure to Canadians that renewable resources will be renewed. It is for those things that I ask a mandate, not giving you tonight the whole

¹⁹ Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963).

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 69-70.

picture at all, by any means, but giving you something of the Vision as I see it. The reason I appeal to the Canadian people, (is for) a mandate, for a clear majority. You set a pace for Manitoba last time. Give us a few more, this. (sic) We need a clear majority to carry out this long-range plan, this great design, this blueprint for the Canada which her resources make possible.²¹

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John Diefenbaker's charisma established an empathy with his audiences. His listeners came away lost in a cause they did not fully comprehend. When he stood bare-headed in the rain, addressing a small crowd at Penticton, British Columbia, some of his listeners were seen closing their umbrellas. In Fredericton, New Brunswick, a crush of swooning women held up their children to touch the hem of his coat. At Grand Falls, Newfoundland, he brought an audience of rough loggers to their feet with the appeal: 'We'll build a nation of fifty million people within the lifetime of many of you here. I'm asking you to catch a Vision of the greatness, and the potential of this nation.'²²

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Everywhere, Diefenbaker repeated his message. 'Join with me,' he would beg, as the television spotlights shone on his piercing eyes, making them blaze like diamonds. 'Join with me, to catch the vision of men and women who rise above these things that ordinarily hold you to the soil. Join with me to bring about the achievement of that Canada, one Canada, the achievement of Canada's destiny! . . .'²³

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Toward the end of the campaign, at a small Toronto rally, Diefenbaker confessed that his cross-country tour gave him 'the heart throb . . . the elevation . . . the something indefinable that makes me forget the long hours, the labour, and the distance I have travelled. . . . Everywhere I go I see that uplift in people's eyes that comes from raising their sights to see the Vision of Canada in days ahead. Instead of the hopelessness and fear the Liberals generate we have given faith; instead of desperation we offer inspiration.'²⁴

21 Ibid., p. 70.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., p. 72.

24 Ibid., p. 73.

The following paragraph seems to best sum up Newman's view of the Diefenbaker appeal during the 1958 campaign:

It was as if the people had come to identify John Diefenbaker with their own individual desires for a trouble-free future. At times the election seemed somehow to move beyond politics. Diefenbaker transformed it into a secular passion play, with himself as its quasi-devine hero. In that campaign, Diefenbaker possessed that rare quality of leadership, known as 'charisma.'²⁵

²⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

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